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Resumo 
 
Fricções financeiras constituem imperfeições nos mercados financeiros – por exemplo, mercados 
de crédito e de derivados - e, portanto, desvios dos quadros teóricos vigentes. Estas imperfeições 
constituem toda e qualquer situação passível de colocar um ou mais agentes económicos numa 
posição de vantagem comparativa em relação aos demais. Um exemplo recorrente de um tipo de 
fricções financeiras são as assimetrias de informação (Fu, 1996), que se podem manifestar de 
várias maneiras e, de acordo com a literatura empírica, ter vários tipos de repercussões. Com vista 
a contribuir para o corpo de literatura a ser produzido nesta área de investigação, e pela pertinência 
do tema à data da escrita desta dissertação, pretende-se construir um modelo teórico em que se 
estabeleça uma relação, na solução de equilíbrio da economia, entre um tipo específico de 
assimetrias de informação e o crescimento económico de longo prazo. No modelo proposto, o 
setor de bens de capitais opera num mercado monopolista, em que existem incentivos ao 
endividamento e posterior aquisição de patentes tecnológicas. Pretende-se ainda verificar a 
validade empírica do quadro teórico, com auxílio de estimadores Arellano-Bond (1998), aplicados 
em painéis dinâmicos. 
Palavras-chave: fricções financeiras, mercados de crédito, assimetrias, crescimento económico. 
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Abstract 
 
Financial frictions are imperfections observed in financial markets – e.g., credit and derivatives’ 
markets – and, therefore, deviations from the existing theoretical frameworks. These imperfections 
comprise every situation capable of putting some economic agent(s) in a position of advantage, 
relative to another(s). One common example of a type of financial frictions are informational 
asymmetries (Fu, 1996), that can express themselves in several way and, according to the 
empirical literature on the subject, have different kinds of consequences. With the purpose of 
contribute to the body of literature being produced in this research area, and by the relevance of 
this topic at the time of writing, we want to build a theoretical model in which we establish a relation 
between a particular kind of informational asymmetries and long term economic growth. In our 
proposed model, the capital goods’ sector operates in monopolistic competition, where there are 
incentives to indebtedness and consequent patents’ acquisition. We finally verify the empirical 
validity of our proposed theoretical framework with Arellano-Bond estimators (1998) applied to 
dynamic panels. 
Keywords: financial frictions, credit markets, asymmetries, economic growth. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
With the latest financial crisis came the realization that finance’s impact on the real economy is 
definitely not innocuous. Not only have financial markets become greatly important for most 
developed countries, moving trillions of dollars on a daily basis, but they have also come to connect 
virtually all countries through increasingly complex and sophisticated instruments, thereby 
increasing the forms of liquidity available in the economy. Although these markets may present 
themselves as alternative sources of financing for traditionally bank-based economies such as the 
Eurozone, the ever-growing global interconnectedness carries some concerning drawbacks, such 
as important resource misallocations during the expansion phase of a financial cycle, and financial 
hyper-sensitivity due to increased systemic risk. 
While one part of the existing literature already considers fluctuations in asset prices, credit and 
capital flows as some key factors of disturbance upon real macroeconomic variables (Claessens & 
Kose, 2018), another part does not acknowledge the role of financial frictions in the transmission 
of shocks through, e.g., asset prices, net worth, interest rates and/or monetary channels 
(Christiano, Eichenbaum, & Evans, 2005). The inexistence of consensus regarding the role of 
financial frictions in the real economy makes it hard to grasp and interpret in depth the whole 
economic reality. Reflecting this “academic and empirical controversy regarding the importance of 
financial channels” in the real economy (Gerke et al, 2012), most economic growth models do not 
contemplate financial frictions. 
Jokivuolle and Tunaru (2017, pp. 1-7) do point out that every financial-economic crisis seems to 
be different from its predecessor, with no apparent regularity, although some specific types of asset, 
such as the real estate, appear to be more sensible to financial fluctuations. Nevertheless, crises 
can be interpreted, to some extent, as extreme manifestations of the existing relationship between 
the financial sector and the real economy (Claessens & Kose, 2013), which makes a strong call 
on economists to endeavor for a better understanding of macro-financial interactions. Plenty 
academic and policy literature has been produced in recent years on this topic. Even though there 
are still many questions unanswered, it is also true that some common denominators to financial 
dynamics have already been found. This claim is supported by the convergence of some key 
parameters used in policy models from institutions such as the Bundesbank, the European Central 
Bank, Banca d’Italia, Sveriges Riksbank and the National Bank of Poland (Gerke, et al., 2013). 
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It follows that Blanchard (2018), Borio (2018), Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2017), among others, 
regard existing theoretical models as no longer fully able to address current macroeconomic 
phenomena, specifically, that of the role of finance in the real economy. Notwithstanding, some 
notable advances have been made in recent years on this topic. Our work heavily relied on some 
significant studies such as Kiyotaki and More (1997) and, to a larger extent, Bernanke et al (1999). 
Wishing to contribute to this call for theoretical macroeconomic developments, we propose a 
growth model that contemplates financial frictions. This study explores the interactions between 
real growth variables and a particular kind of financial frictions that arises from informational 
asymmetries, within one economy, over an infinite horizon. Starting with a cost state verification 
problem, similarly to Morales (2003), we find the existence of a limit at which the existence of 
financial frictions appears to be irrelevant for economic growth, while the impact outside the 
neighborhood of this limit can either be negative or positive, depending on the possible marginal 
relations between an elasticity measure and growth. 
We proceed as follows. In Section 2, we explain some of the literature’s and our model’s underlying 
roots and mechanics, with special emphasis on Romer’s model of endogenous growth (Evans, 
Honkapohja, & Romer, 1998), and the modelling of some types of financial frictions, with special 
emphasis on Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), hereafter referred as BGG. In particular, the 
choice of BGG as one of the underlying models has been made due to a perceived consensus in 
the literature regarding its importance in introducing and explaining financial frictions in dynamic 
economic modelling. In Section 3 we build our proposed model and proceed to find a balanced 
growth path solution and its main predictions. Here, we also focus on the main effects of 
informational asymmetries between the model’s agents on economic growth. Throughout section 
4 we conduct an empirical analysis with dynamic panel data estimation methods, finishing with 
some concluding remarks in Section 5.  
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2. Literature Review 
 
The matter of the determinants of economic growth and aggregate wealth distribution are key 
issues of macroeconomic studies and attempts to model these phenomena go far back. Solow 
(1956) developed a growth model based on physical capital accumulation with an exogenous 
household’s rate of savings, showing how long-run growth depends upon technical changes. Later, 
the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model endogenizes the saving rate, by deriving the evolution of capital 
stock from the interaction between maximizing firms and infinitely-lived households in competitive 
markets, thereby providing a check on Solow’s model, by showing that it survives once the analyst 
allows for more complex saving behavior. Both models build upon a one sector economy with a 
production function that takes as inputs 𝐾(𝑡) and 𝐴(𝑡)𝐿(𝑡), respectively, functions of capital and 
effective labor, the latter given by the labor function 𝐿(𝑡) and an effectiveness function 𝐴(𝑡) that 
proxies technological progress and, more precisely, a continuum of types of knowledge, ranging 
from the highly abstract to the highly applied. In both models, however, labor growth and 
technological progress are exogenous. 
One could argue that the models that followed these studies were either based on human capital 
or technological progress as the main long-term growth determinants1. The first example of a 
human capital-based macroeconomic growth model was developed by Lucas (1988). The author 
assumed a linear specification for the accumulation of human capital, which then allowed for 
endogenous growth. Earlier studies such as that of Becker (1964) helped the formulation of such 
theoretical models by drawing important macroeconomic implications from a microeconomic study 
of the links between education, output and overall economic performance. Despite the existence 
of a large body of literature on human capital-based growth models, we’ve chosen to support the 
endogenous growth on technological progress. 
The case for the importance of technological progress – often measured as investment on research 
and development (R&D) - on economic growth is overwhelming. Perhaps one of the first relevant 
papers in doing so was that of Solow (1956), whose empirical work had as an important result the 
fact that accumulation of physical capital alone cannot account for most of the growth over time in 
the output per person – a very significant finding for the argument against the classical convergence 
hypothesis. Following works such as Arrow (1962), Phelps (1966) Evans et al (1998), Shell (2010) 
                                                             
1 A third group of macroeconomic growth models, albeit less representative, eliminates the assumption of diminishing returns to capital in the 
aggregate production function. 
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made strong contributions for the current understanding of the role of technological progress in 
economic growth, suggesting that increases on the level of resources allocated to the R&D sector 
and consequent invention of new capital goods leads to a continuously increasing growth, through 
overall enhancements in terms of costs, output and resource allocation. The following subsection 
explains Romer’s model of endogenous growth in detail. 
 
2.1. Romer’s model  
 
The model of endogenous growth developed by George Evans, Seppo Honkapohja and Paul Romer 
(1998) comprises a set of properties that makes it utterly desirable to study and extend to the 
financial sector. First, the technology here is, to a large extent, endogenous2. This allows one to 
fully analyze the system’s dynamics around the steady-state equilibria, regarding this 
unambiguously important variable. Second, building upon the rational expectations’ hypothesis, 
i.e., perfect-foresight, the model delivers multiplicity of equilibria in the (𝑔, 𝑟) space – common in 
Arrow-Debreu economies. This feature, and its extension by the introduction of expectational 
indeterminacy, delivers some convenient properties that characterize sequential economies, a 
framework often used to study the financial sector. 
We start with a three-sector economy3 – final goods’, capital or intermediate goods’ and R&D 
sectors. Labor is assumed to be fixed and positive in any moment in time. Furthermore, denoting 
𝐿𝐴(𝑡) as the function of labor devoted to R&D, and 𝐿𝑌(𝑡) the function of labor devoted to the final 
goods’ sector, we’ll have that, in any moment in time, the existence of equilibrium in the labor 
market implies that 
 
(2.1) 𝐿𝐴(𝑡) + 𝐿𝑌(𝑡) = 𝐿(𝑡)  
 
The economy faces a Cobb-Douglas-like production function 
 
                                                             
2 The authors design an output function of technology dependent on a parameter that reflects the incentives to R&D, which is formally exogenous. 
3 The model’s derivation follows the works of Evans et al (1998), Thompson (2003) and Romer (2012). 
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(2.2) 
𝑌(𝑡) ∶= 𝐹(𝐿, 𝑥(. )) =  𝐿𝑌(𝑡)
1−𝛼 (∫ 𝑥𝑖(𝑡)
𝐴(𝑡)
0
𝑑𝑖)
𝛼
 
 
 
in which 𝐾(𝑡) =  ∫ 𝑥𝑖(𝑡)
𝐴(𝑡)
0
𝑑𝑖, which represents the capital at any given time, for 𝛼 ∈]0, 1[, 
𝐴(𝑡), which is assumed to be continuous, represents the range of differentiated capital goods that 
have already been designed (proxy for technological progress and new ideas and designs), and 
𝑥𝑖(. ) represents the number of units of capital of type i in use. The model, therefore, presents 
constant returns to scale, while 𝑥𝑖(. ) presents diminishing returns to scale. However, given that 
𝐴 is productive, technological growth compensates for the latter effect. Furthermore, it is assumed 
that the same production technology is used in all productive activities, i.e., (1) making 
consumption goods, (2) designs for new types of machines and (3) physical capital machines for 
types that have already been designed. Hence, the relative price of each output, given by the slope 
of the economy’s production possibility frontier, is linear. 
The model also assumes an infinitely lived representative consumer that maximizes its discounted 
CRRA-like utility of future consumption 𝐶(𝑡) 
 
(2.3) 
∫ 𝑒−𝜌𝑡𝑢(𝐶(𝑡))𝑑𝑡
∞
0
, 𝑢(𝐶(𝑡)) =
𝐶(𝑡)1−𝜎
1 − 𝜎
 
 
 
subject to a budget constraint similar with that of the Ramsey-Crass-Koopmans model, where the 
present value of the lifetime consumption cannot exceed the consumer’s initial wealth plus the 
present value of his lifetime labor income, such that  
 
(2.4) 
∫ 𝑒−𝑟𝑡𝐶(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
∞
𝑡=0
 ≤ 𝑋(0) + ∫ 𝑒−𝑟𝑡𝑤(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
∞
𝑡=0
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from which results, by defining and calculating the Hamiltonian function, that the consumer faced 
with the constant rate of return 𝑟 will rationally choose to have his consumption growing at the rate 
given by the Euler equation 
 
(2.5) 
𝑔𝐶 ∶=
𝐶(𝑡)̇
𝐶(𝑡)
=
1
𝜎
(𝑟 − 𝜌) 
 
 
When dealing with time-varying production functions, one needs to address the matter of the inputs’ 
accumulation functions, i.e., the inputs’ production functions. Therefore, capital accumulation is 
given by 
 
(2.6) 𝐾(𝑡)̇ = 𝑌(𝑡) − 𝐶(𝑡)  
 
where the underlying assumption is that the real sector is always in equilibrium, that is, investment 
equals the private sector’s savings. This is an important observation to make, as it will follow us 
throughout the paper, being particularly relevant when analyzing the short-run capital structure 
model for the financial sector from Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993). Furthermore, given that the 
production function for new ideas is linear in the labor devoted to the R&D sector, and proportional 
to the existing stock of knowledge, its accumulation function is  
 
(2.7) 𝐴(𝑡)̇ = 𝐵𝐿𝐴(𝑡)𝐴(𝑡)  
 
where 𝐵 > 0 represents the efficiency of the research activities, and 𝐴(0) > 0. The linearity of 
𝐴(𝑡)̇  in 𝐴(𝑡) implies the existence of a balanced growth path solution4. Knowledge interferes in 
the production in two ways. First, a new design implies the production of a new capital good, which 
                                                             
4 This is easily seen by solving the ordinary differential equation (2.7) for 𝐴(𝑡), from where we get that 
 
 𝐴(𝑡) = 𝐴(0)𝑒∫ 𝐿𝐴(𝜏)𝑑𝜏
𝑡
0   
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will be, as I will soon explain, rented to the final goods’ sector. Furthermore, it increases the existing 
stock of knowledge, which constitutes a positive5 externality, given the non-rivalry property of 
knowledge. This is the first important characteristic of knowledge that conveys important 
implications for the model. The other one is its partial excludability through patent laws, which is 
fundamental for the set of a monopolistic competition framework in the capital goods’ sector. 
Second, the higher the existing stock of knowledge 𝐴(𝑡), the higher the marginal productivity of 
researchers. This is a trivial consequence of the production function (2.2). 
Unlike the capital goods’ sector, the final goods’ sector finds itself in a perfect competition 
environment. The latter rents capital goods at a rent 𝑅(𝑡) =
𝑑𝑌(𝑡)
𝑑𝑥(𝑡)
 which it pays to the capital 
goods’ sector which, in turn, faces the following supply curve6, 
 
(2.8) 𝑅(𝑡) = 𝛼𝐿𝑌
1−𝛼𝑥(𝑡)𝛼−1  
 
The problem lies, now, on how the capital goods sector, which operates in monopolistic competition, 
makes its production decisions. Assuming an unrestricted borrowing capacity at a fixed interest 
rate 𝑟, the monopolistic producers maximize their profits 
 
(2.9) 𝜋(𝑡) = 𝑅(𝑡)𝑥(𝑡) − 𝑟𝑥(𝑡)  
 
from where we, after taking the first order conditions, get the monopoly price 
 
(2.10) 𝑅 =
𝑟
𝛼
  
 
                                                             
5 This is true because R&D firms are not required to compensate the researchers for past ideas. However, it is neglected by the authors, hence 
creating a source of non-optimality of the final general-equilibrium solution, as it will be shown ahead. 
6 The model enjoys the symmetry property, which means that 𝑥𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑥(𝑡) , implying that 𝑅𝑖(𝑡) = 𝑅(𝑡) and 𝜋𝑖(𝑡) = 𝜋(𝑡). 
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The background assumption that the developer of an idea has monopoly rights to the use of the 
idea implies that the developer can charge above the marginal production cost for the use of the 
idea. This generates profits that create incentives for R&D. The free-entry condition of the R&D 
sector implies that the present value of future discounted profits of selling the input embodying a 
new idea must, at least, equal the cost of creating. That is, the price of the initial investment is 
 
(2.11) 
𝑃𝐴(𝑡) = ∫ 𝑒
−𝑟(𝜏−𝑡)𝜋(𝜏)𝑑𝜏
∞
𝑡
=
𝑤(𝑡)
𝐵𝐴(𝑡)
 
 
 
where 𝑤(𝑡) represents the wage. By applying the Leibniz rule to its time differentiation, we get 
 
(2.12) 
𝑃?̇?(𝑡) = ∫ 𝑟𝑒
−𝑟(𝜏−𝑡)𝜋(𝜏)𝑑𝜏
∞
𝑡
+ [𝑒−𝑟(𝜏−𝑡)𝜋(𝜏)]
𝑡
∞
= 𝑟𝑃𝐴(𝑡) − 𝜋(𝑡)  
 
 
 
which Thompson (2003) interprets as being the trade-off that the companies face between 
investing the existing endowments at the risk-free return and investing on a patent and therefore 
opting for the risky monopoly rent returns, at any given time.  
When we analyze the model’s long run dynamics, we are interested on a balanced growth path 
solution that, by (2.7), we know to exist. By observing that, on a balanced growth path, the rate of 
interest 𝑟 must be constant, we find, through (2.8), that the capital goods production 
 
(2.13) 
𝑥(𝑡) = 𝐿𝑌(𝑡) [
𝛼2
𝑟
]
1
1−𝛼
 
 
 
is also constant, giving that 𝐿𝑌(𝑡) is fixed. This result consequently yields, by some substitutions 
in (2.2), that 𝐾 and 𝑌 grow at the same rate as 𝐴. Therefore,  
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(2.14) 𝑔𝑌 = 𝑔𝐾 = 𝑔𝐴  
 
From which we can, by dividing (7) by 𝐴(𝑡), reach the technological progress growth mechanism 
 
(2.15) 𝑔𝐴 = 𝐵𝐿𝐴(𝑡)  
 
which implies that the growth rate of the technological progress depends on the number of 
researchers at any moment in time (assuming full employment of the production factor 𝐿). 
The assumption that the labor market is competitive implies that the wages are the same in every 
sector. Therefore, the intersection between the following equations 
 
(2.16.1) 
𝑤𝑌 =
𝑑𝑌(𝑡)
𝑑𝐿𝑌(𝑡)
= (1 − 𝛼) [
𝐴𝑥
𝐿𝑌
]
𝛼
 
 
 
(2.16.2) 
𝑤𝐴 = 
𝑑?̇?
𝑑𝐿𝐴(𝑡)
𝑃𝐴 = 𝐵𝐴𝑃𝐴 
 
 
yields the equilibrium price of investment in R&D 
 
(2.17) 
𝑃𝐴 =
1 − 𝛼
𝐵
[
𝐴𝑥
𝐿𝑌
]
𝛼
 
 
 
which implies that 𝑃?̇? = 0 and, therefore, by (2.12), 
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(2.18) 𝑟 =
𝜋
𝑃𝐴
  
 
substituting in by the corresponding equations for the firms’ profits 𝜋(𝑡), (2.8) and (2.17), we get 
 
(2.19) 𝑔𝐴 = 𝐵?̅? −
𝑟
𝛼
  
 
This important result can be extended, by working on the accumulation functions, hence concluding 
that the aggregate economy’s growth rate, under the perfect-foresight hypothesis, is given by  
 
(2.20) 
𝑔 =
𝛿𝛼?̅? − 𝜌
𝛼 + 𝜎
 
 
 
The multiple equilibria appear when we introduce expectational indeterminacy in the model, under 
which changes in expectations cause the economy to switch between the high and low growth rate 
states, and when we combine complementarity effects between capital goods with a non-linear 
trade-off between investment and consumption. The first step is to define a state variable 𝑍  
 
(2.21) 𝑍 = 𝑎𝐴(𝑡) + 𝐾(𝑡)  
 
which comprises both physical capital and the patents. Hence, 
 
(2.22) 𝐶(𝑡) = 𝑦(𝑡) − 𝑍(𝑡)̇   
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Equation (2.22) characterizes a linear trade-off between consumption and investment. In order to 
introduce non-linearity (and, consequently, variability of the relative price of sectorial outputs), the 
authors create a convex cost function 𝜒(. ) such that 
 
(2.23) 
𝐶(𝑡) = 𝑦(𝑡) − 𝑍(𝑡)𝜒 (
𝑍(𝑡 + 1) − 𝑍(𝑡) − 𝐷(𝑡)
𝑍(𝑡)
) 
 
 
in which 𝐷(𝑡) represents any depreciation of the physical capital stock. In order to later reach the 
BGP solution, the authors introduce the relative price of general capital 𝑍 given by7 
 
(2.24) 𝑃𝑍 = 𝜒′(𝑔𝑍)  
 
When considering equation (2.2), we realize that it implies that the capital goods are additively 
separable – therefore, independent. In order to introduce complementarity between capital goods, 
the authors specify 
 
(2.25) 
𝑦(𝑡) = 𝐿1−𝛼 (∫ 𝑥(𝑡)𝛾
𝐴(𝑡)
0
𝑑𝑖)
𝜃
 
 
 
where 𝜃𝛾 = 𝛼, and 𝜃 > 1. If we assume that one unit of 𝑍 is required for the production each 
physical machine, we’ll have it distributed between machinery and new designs’ investment 
 
                                                             
7 We take the limit, by ignoring the depreciation 𝐷(𝑡)  
 
 𝑍(𝑡 + 1) − 𝑍(𝑡)
𝑍(𝑡)
≈
?̇?
𝑍
≡  𝑔𝑍 
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(26) 
𝑍(𝑡) = ∫ 𝑥𝑖(𝑡)𝑑𝑖
𝐴(𝑡)
0
+∫ 𝑖𝜀𝑑𝑖
𝐴(𝑡)
0
= 𝐾(𝑡) + ∫ 𝑖𝜀𝑑𝑖
𝐴(𝑡)
0
 
 
 
in which 𝑖𝜀 represents the units of Z necessary for the production of the i-ith patent for a given 
capital good. To force the system to converge for a balanced growth path solution, the following 
restriction is made 
 
(2.27) 
𝜀 =
𝜃 − 1
1 − 𝛼
 
 
 
which the authors have obtained through numerical methods. Similar assumptions of those made 
for solving the model without capital goods’ complementarities nor non-linear trade-off between 
investment and consumption lead to the multi-equilibria solution. The profit maximizing capital 
goods’ sector sets the monopolistic rent equal to their inputs’ marginal productivity 
 
(2.28) 
𝑅(𝑡) =
𝑑𝑦(𝑡)
𝑑𝑥(𝑡)
= 𝜃𝛾𝐿1−𝛼𝑥(𝑡)𝛾−1 (∫ 𝑥(𝑡)𝛾
𝐴(𝑡)
0
𝑑𝑖)
𝜃−1
 
 
 
Now, the monopolistic firm maximizes it revenues 𝑅(𝑡)𝑥(𝑡), with respect to its expenditures 
𝑟𝑃𝑍𝑥(𝑡). The first order condition yields that 
 
(2.29) 
𝑅 =
𝑟𝑃𝑍
𝛾
 
 
 
which enables us to, through the model’s symmetry properties, solve the problem for its balanced 
growth path, from where we get 
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(2.30) 𝑔𝑍 = 𝑔𝐾 = 𝑔𝑌 = (1 + 𝜀)𝑔𝐴  
 
The key to determine 𝑔𝐴 is to impose the non-transversality condition that arises from the Fisher 
equation on 𝐴(𝑡), such that 
 
(2.31) 
𝑃𝑍𝐴(𝑡)
𝜀 = ∫ 𝑒−𝑟(𝜏−𝑡)𝜋(𝜏)𝑑𝜏
∞
𝑡
 
 
 
which, by time-differentiating, with 𝑃𝑍 held constant, gives 
 
(2.32) 
𝑔𝐴 =
1
𝜀
(𝑟 −
𝜋
𝑃𝑍𝐴(𝑡)𝜀
) 
 
 
We can reduce (2.32) by one degree of uncertainty by transforming the equation so it becomes 
dependent on the behavioral parameter 𝛼. This equation then delivers the new growth curve, given 
by a more complex form that generalizes (2.20). In any macroeconomics setting, whenever there 
are multi-equilibria, we have learned to accept that they have different degrees of stability. The 
concept of stability relates with the idea that, for a given set of initial values for the state variable, 
the system’s dynamic behavior will make it fluctuate between equilibriums. In particular, (2.32) 
provides us a multiple equilibrium framework, which will fluctuate between the high and low growth 
solutions, depending on time-specific phenomena and preferences. Therefore, the authors 
introduced the stability under learning criterium, implying that the agents will learn and react to the 
variables’ values at any given time, according to the following rule 
 
(2.33) 
𝑟(𝑡 + 1)𝑒 = 𝑟(𝑡)𝑒 + 𝛿(𝑡)(𝑟(𝑡) − 𝑟(𝑡)𝑒), 𝛿(𝑡) =
𝛿
𝑡
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hence generating a dynamic interest rate that tells us how the equilibria fluctuate. Under this 
framework, agents base their consumption/investment choices on expected values for the future 
interest rate, 𝑟𝑒, which will, in turn, affect the aggregate growth rate. This aggregate growth rate 
is, in turn, considered on the firms’ production decisions, which require a sufficient amount of 
financial aid, which is dependent on the realization of the interest rate. This generates growth cycles, 
providing the existence of a dynamic rate of interest. 
 
 
2.2. On the financial sector: some relevant literature 
 
What the previous section fails to contemplate is the possibility of agent-based disturbance factors. 
These appear in the literature in many ways, such as intermediary rates and capital flows, or any 
type of information asymmetries. Their effects on financial markets are, however, controversial. 
Trivedi (2015) finds, by analyzing financial innovation8 on the Indian banking system, a positive 
relation between innovation and enhanced bank performance, measured in terms of profitability 
and stability of the income. Similar conclusions regarding the beneficial effects of innovation are 
found in Guimaraes et al (2010), for whom it comprises dimensions such as strategic leadership, 
competitive intelligence, management of technology and some specific characteristics of the bank 
or firm’s change process used to conduct innovation projects. However, Epure and Lafuente (2015), 
by analyzing the Costa Rican banking sector, argue that, although the general average bank-specific 
inefficiency has decreased in the pre-2008 period, characterized by increased innovation practices, 
no such relation was observed during the post-crisis period, during which the average banking 
specific inefficiency scores from the authors’ technology concept, and the average return on assets 
and net interest margin all remained relatively unchanged. This second period faced a significant 
increase on the regulatory pressure, therefore jeopardizing innovative impulses and practices, on 
a global scale. Therefore, at least at a micro level, it may be reasonable to assume that the effects 
of financial frictions on economic performance aren’t all straightforward.  
In a frictionless economy, funds can flow to the most profitable project, and such flows are 
determined by differences in productivity and risk aversion at the micro level, and differences in 
                                                             
8 The author studies financial innovation as being foremost, but not exclusively, the search for development of new income sources and consequent 
increases in portfolio diversification, at the bank-level. These include, e.g., non-loan related fees. 
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capital and labor at the macro level (Brunnermeier, Eisenbach, & Sannikov, 2013). In an economy 
with financial frictions, however, there is an inherent instability and the agent dynamics are utterly 
probabilistic, due to the existence of uncertainty. Hall (2013) suggests that such frictions can be 
thought of as a spread between the returns earned in businesses from the physical capital – plant 
and equipment – and the returns earned by savers, or the market cost of capital. This could suggest 
that the uncertainty sources of an economy are non-negligible for the purposes of economic and 
policy analysis. The accumulation of such frictions prevents funds from flowing to undercapitalized 
sectors, hence preventing Pareto-optimality, through resource misallocations, and generating 
unequal growth and development opportunities. 
The dynamics of economies with financial frictions are highly non-linear9 (Brunnermeier & Sannikov, 
2017), which is why small shocks can lead to significant economic dislocations10. This was the 
case of the Lehman Brothers’ collapse in September 2008, which triggered a self -sustained 
sequence of balance-sheet defaults that spread worldwide. Brunnermeier and Sannikov point out 
that, while the financial markets are self-stabilizing in normal times, economies become quite 
vulnerable to a crisis after a run up of debt imbalances and credit bubbles. Greenwald and Stiglitz 
(1993) developed a simple model of economic fluctuations, that comprises some of the key issues 
that characterize the financial sector’s short-run dynamics, based upon the kinds of informational 
imperfections that are chiefly related to adverse selection and moral hazard. 
There is a significant number of other models that assume various financing restrictions. 
Specifically, we can identify two main approaches of financial frictions in macroeconomics. The 
first approach is due to Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), which focuses on the idea of the inalienability 
of human capital. The assumption results in the lenders’ demand that the value of the borrowers’ 
durable assets must at least equal the value of the outstanding debt. Hence, these assets play a 
dual role – they are both means of production and serve as collateral for current loans. The second 
approach is that of BGG (1999). Despite the similarities between the approaches, such as the need 
of an optimal contract between the lender and the borrower as a solution to an agency problem 
and the feedback effects from asset markets, they are quite different. Essentially, BGG build upon 
a debt contract as a solution to a problem of asymmetric information between the lender and the 
borrower, which endogenously motivates the existence of an external financing premium. Later 
                                                             
9 The very nature of these dynamics makes the system’s behavior inherently probabilistic. 
10 The most important features of such shocks are their persistence, which refers to its duration in time, and amplification, which refers to its ability 
to spread and reproduce its effects along a growing number of agents and economies. 
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models such as that of Morales (2003) build upon the same agency problem as in BGG, albeit in 
a fashion different from the standard sticky price DSGE framework. The following subsection 
explains the partial equilibrium framework of BGG, in the context of the authors’ log -linearized 
stochastic model. 
 
2.3. BGG’s model 
 
BGG give us two reasons for the introduction of financial frictions in macroeconomic models. First, 
doing so seems to enhance the models’ capacity of explaining cyclical fluctuations, such as credit 
supply in the economy. Second, a lot of empirical research on the determinants of aggregate supply 
and demand attributes an important role to financial frictions. Thus, the authors developed a variant 
of the dynamic new keynesian framework – i.e. stochastic aggregate growth that incorporates 
monetary policy, monopolistic competition and nominal price rigidity -, modified to allow for 
financial accelerator effects on investment. Their main purpose is to assess how credit market 
frictions influence the monetary policy transmission mechanisms. 
The model comprises three kinds of agents: households, retailers and entrepreneurs. Similarly to 
Romer’s model, households are assumed to be infinitely lived. Furthermore, they hold the 
economy’s goods, services and interest bearing assets. Retailers are, together with entrepreneurs, 
market suppliers, and are assumed to work in monopolistic competition in order to introduce price 
stickiness in the model. This ensures a linear relation between the demand for capital goods and 
the net worth of this model’s most important agent. 
Entrepreneurs have, indeed, a central role in BGG’s framework. Each single entrepreneur is finitely 
lived, with a constant probability 𝑃 ∈ [0,1] of surviving until the following period. At any given 
moment 𝑡, each entrepreneur buys physical capital, financed by their current net worth and 
external funds, combined with labor to generate output in 𝑡 + 1. The external funds thus finance 
the difference between input costs and the entrepreneur’s net worth, such that 
 
(2.35) 𝐵𝑡+1
𝑗 = 𝑄𝑡𝐾𝑡+1
𝑗 − 𝑁𝑡+1
𝑗
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where 𝐵𝑡+1
𝑗  represents the debt amount that the 𝑗-th entrepreneur must incur in at 𝑡 + 1, 𝑄𝑡 the 
price of capital goods at 𝑡, 𝐾𝑡+1
𝑗
 the amount of capital goods purchased for use at 𝑡 + 1 and 𝑁𝑡+1
𝑗
 
its net worth at the end of 𝑡, going to 𝑡 + 1.  
Building upon Townsend (1979) the authors introduced a cost state verification problem in order 
to endogenously motivate the existence of an external finance premium, which will depend on the 
borrower’s financial position at 𝑡 + 1. The nature of this problem implies that the entrepreneur 
holds more information than the lender, regarding its future net worth, to the extent that he can 
observe its capital returns at 𝑡 + 1. This means that there’s asymmetric information regarding the 
borrower’s ability to repay its loan at  𝑡 + 1, resulting in the need of an optimal contract to mitigate 
the risk of adverse selection and moral hazard. The optimal contract established between the 
lender and the borrower is characterized by the minimum requirement rule for external financing 
 
(2.36) ?̅?𝑗𝛾𝑡+1𝑄𝑡𝐾𝑡+1 = 𝑍𝑡+1
𝑗 𝐵𝑡+1
𝑗
  
 
where 𝑍𝑡+1
𝑗  represents a gross non-default rate, ?̅?𝑗  the limit value of the idiosyncratic shock 𝑤𝑗  
and 𝛾𝑡+1  represents the aggregate risk of the economy. Both 𝑤
𝑗  and 𝛾𝑡+1  are stochastic 
variables. Upon the borrower’s net worth realization at 𝑡 + 1, one of two situations may occur. If 
𝑤𝑗 ≥ ?̅?𝑗 , the borrower is able to repay the loan at the rate 𝑍𝑡+1
𝑗  to the financial intermediary. If, 
however, 𝑤𝑗 < ?̅?𝑗 , the borrower goes bankrupt. This means that the intermediary incurs in an 
auditing cost ℎ𝑤𝛾𝑡+1𝑄𝑡𝐾𝑡+1 and keeps what he finds, while the defaulting entrepreneur receives 
nothing. Given the finite cardinality of the relevant set of nature states of 𝑤𝑗  at any given moment, 
and assuming that the intermediary is able to diversify its portfolio, the loan contract satisfies 
 
(2.37) 
{[1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑗)]?̅?𝑗 + (1 − ℎ)∫ 𝑤𝑑𝐹(𝑤)
?̅?𝑗
0
} 𝛾𝑡+1
𝑘 𝑄𝑡𝐾𝑡+1
𝑗
= 𝑟𝑡+1(𝑄𝑡𝐾𝑡+1
𝑗 − 𝑁𝑡+1
𝑗 ) 
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where 𝑟𝑡+1 represents the riskless rate at 𝑡 + 1. This way, we are able the express the lender’s 
expect return as a function of the cutoff value of the idiosyncratic shock ?̅?𝑗  on the entrepreneur’s 
productivity. Once we’ve determined the value for ?̅?𝑗 , contingent upon the ex post realization of 
the systemic shock 𝛾𝑡+1
𝑘  and the ex ante choices of 𝑄𝑡𝐾𝑡+1
𝑗  and 𝐵𝑡+1
𝑗 , we now address the 
entrepreneur’s optimal choice of 𝐾𝑡+1
𝑗 . By making expectations regarding the realization of 𝛾𝑡+1
𝑘 , 
the entrepreneur maximizes  
 
(2.38) 
𝐸 {[1 − ℎ∫ 𝑤𝑑𝐹(𝑤)
?̅?𝑗
0
]𝑈𝑡+1
𝑟𝑘 }𝐸{𝛾𝑡+1
𝑘 }𝑄𝑡𝐾𝑡+1
𝑗
− 𝑟𝑡+1(𝑄𝑡𝐾𝑡+1
𝑗 − 𝑁𝑡+1
𝑗 ) 
 
 
subject to (2.37), where 𝑈𝑡+1
𝑟𝑘 ≡
𝛾𝑡+1
𝑘
𝐸{𝛾𝑡+1
𝑘 }
. The external finance premium is thus derived from the 
monitoring costs, which the entrepreneur internalizes due to the assumption that he is risk neutral. 
The maximization of (2.38) relative to 𝐾𝑡+1
𝑗  and ?̅?𝑗 yields the following relation for optimal capital 
purchases: 
 
(2.39) 𝑄𝑡𝐾𝑡+1
𝑗 = 𝜑(𝑠𝑡)𝑁𝑡+1
𝑗 , 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝜑(1) = 1, 𝜑′(. ) > 0  
 
where 𝑠𝑡 ≡ 𝐸 {
𝛾𝑡+1
𝑘
𝑟𝑡+1
} represents the expected discounted return to capital. This means that the 
higher the expected capital returns relative to the riskless rate – i.e. the loan repayment’s rate 
minus the premium – the higher the capital investment and, consequently, the higher the 
indebtedness. There is also a multiplicative effect of the entrepreneur’s net worth on capital 
acquisition. Therefore, the higher the financial stability, the larger the credit and the capital 
investment. Furthermore, this implicitly means that the higher the expected discounted return, the 
lower the expected default probability. 
This partial equilibrium is integrated within a broader framework. The authors specify an Romer’s-
like aggregate production function for any 𝑡 given by 
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(2.40) 𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴𝑡𝐾𝑡
𝛼𝐿𝑡
1−𝛼  
 
where 𝑌𝑡 represents the aggregate output of wholesale goods, 𝐾𝑡 the aggregate amount of capital 
purchased by entrepreneurs in period 𝑡 − 1 , 𝐿𝑡  the labor input and 𝐴𝑡  is an exogenous 
technological parameter. The discrete accumulation function for the aggregate capital purchases 
is given by 
 
(2.41) 
𝐾𝑡+1 = 𝜃 (
𝐼𝑡
𝐾𝑡
)𝐾𝑡 + (1 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑡 , 𝜃(0) = 0, 𝜃
′(. ) > 0 
 
 
where 𝐼𝑡  represents the aggregate investment expenditures and 𝛿  the depreciation rate. The 
inclusion of adjustment costs results in a variable price of capital, making price variability contribute 
to volatility in entrepreneurial net worth, which the authors define by  
 
(2.42) 𝑁𝑡+1 = 𝑃𝑉𝑡 +𝑊𝑡
𝑒  
 
where 
 
(2.43) 𝑉𝑡 = 𝛾𝑡
𝑘𝑄𝑡−1𝐾𝑡
− (𝑟𝑡 +
ℎ∫ 𝑤𝛾𝑡
𝑘𝑄𝑡−1𝐾𝑡 𝑑𝐹(𝑤)
?̅?𝑗
0
𝑄𝑡−1𝐾𝑡 − 𝑁𝑡−1
)(𝑄𝑡−1𝐾𝑡 − 𝑁𝑡−1) 
 
represents the entrepreneurial equity and 𝑊𝑡
𝑒  denotes the entrepreneurial wage 11. By further 
specifying the total labor input as 
 
                                                             
11 The authors assume that, besides their net worth and external funds, entrepreneurs finance their current period’s production through the inelastic 
supply of one unit of labor to the labor market. 
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(2.44) 𝐿𝑡 = 𝐻𝑡
Ω(𝐻𝑡
𝑒)1−Ω  
 
where Ω ∈]0,1[, the authors obtained the demand curves for household and entrepreneurial 
labor, through which they deduced the aggregate entrepreneurial net worth 
 
(2.45) 
𝑁𝑡+1 = 𝑃 [𝛾𝑡
𝑘𝑄𝑡−1𝐾𝑡 − (𝑟𝑡 +
ℎ∫ 𝑤𝛾𝑡
𝑘𝑄𝑡−1𝐾𝑡 𝑑𝐹(𝑤)
?̅?𝑗
0
𝑄𝑡−1𝐾𝑡 −𝑁𝑡−1
)(𝑄𝑡−1𝐾𝑡 −𝑁𝑡−1)]
+ (1 − 𝛼)(1 − Ω)𝐴𝑡𝐾𝑡
𝛼𝐻𝑡
(1−𝛼)Ω 
 
 
Equation (2.45) thus describes the endogenous variation in the aggregate net worth, whilst the 
aggregate form of (2.39) describes how financial strength and expectations regarding future 
systemic shocks influence the cost of capital. After introducing household, retail and government 
sectors, the authors obtained the full model through regular Taylor approximations of the stochastic 
factors. The final set of log-linearized equations allows the researcher to assess the monetary policy 
transmission mechanisms in a macroeconomic environment with financial frictions. 
 
 
2.4. Some final considerations 
 
This section comprised some theoretical examples from the fields of economic growth and finance 
and was meant to explore the possibility of synergy between the two. Although some of the most 
relevant endogenous growth models don’t necessarily comprise agent-based financial frictions, 
some partial equilibrium frameworks have appeared in the literature to meet this area of research 
potential. Despite a perceived consensus in the literature regarding the relative importance of 
studies such as BGG (1999) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), others have managed to introduce 
different financial factors within more conventional frameworks. Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993), 
from a two-agent labor-dependent economy with risk averse firms, built a general price level which 
fluctuates according to a marginal bankruptcy cost. Similarly to BGG, firms make decisions 
according to an equation that reflects their solvency situation. By construction, they show that the 
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representative firm’s profit maximizing output is a linear function of their equity. Others, like Pietra 
and Siconolfi (1996), characterize the economy’s equilibrium as the representative household’s 
maximization problem, which depends on expectations about future realizations of stochastic 
variables – namely, the asset prices according to which their portfolio allocations vary. By 
representing the economy as a space of real open subsets representing the households’ utility 
functions, the authors represented the equilibrium price solution as a smooth manifold 
diffeomorphic to the space in which all states of nature are embedded. Hernández and Santos 
(1996) follow a similar methodology. 
Given the in-depth analysis of Romer and BGG’s models, the following section will proceed to 
integrate some of the mechanisms. There are a few factors that motivated the choice of the latter 
in the proposed expansion. First, in both models we find three productive sectors, with at least one 
working in monopolistic competition. Second, in both models we find a retailer – albeit with different 
designations – and an intermediate goods sector whose production inputs are capital goods. These 
factors hint at a similar architecture base between the two models, which may suggest a possible 
complementarity between them.  
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3. Extending Romer’s model: an endogenous growth model with 
financial frictions 
 
In this section, we proceed as follows. First, we address some of the technical incompatibilities 
between Romer’s model and BGG’s partial equilibrium framework. The purpose is to he lp 
understand the specific challenges that one needs to face if we ought to create a full general 
equilibrium model with financial frictions. Second, we start building Romer’s model with our 
proposed modifications, whilst explaining why we believe they can be implemented. Third, we 
deduce the economy’s balanced growth path solution. Fourth, we analyze the transition dynamics 
of the expanded model, followed by some concluding remarks. 
 
3.1. On the incompatibilities between the existing frameworks 
 
We start by addressing the perfect-foresight hypothesis. Under BGG (1999), this does not hold, 
given that the entrepreneur’s net worth at 𝑡 + 1 is uncertain, subject to a decomposed risk 
measure which captures both the aggregate and the idiosyncratic risk. The uncertainty around the 
net worth’s realization (which we proxy by the capital firms’ profit functions) gives rise to an 
informational asymmetry between the lender and the borrower which, in turn, gives an 
endogenously motivated reason for the existence of an external finance premium within BGG, 
whose existence is meant to compensate the lender for a problem of adverse selection and moral 
hazard 12 . The asymmetry constitutes a financial friction that can lead to more pronounced 
macroeconomic fluctuations, through BGG’s financial accelerator (Claessens & Kose, 2018, pp. 
75-79). We would then argue that Romer’s deterministic setting constitutes a problem for the 
introduction of these financial imperfections. 
Unlike the infinitely lived agents in Romer, the entrepreneurs in BGG are allowed to go bankrupt, 
should the cut-off value of the following period’s capital returns be below the outstanding debt value 
multiplied by the risk-free rate of the economy. This is the external finance rule that borrowers must 
meet at each moment in time, in order to get external financing at 𝑡 and continue the production, 
                                                             
12 The existence of uncertainty around the net worth’s realization and the drawing of an optimal contract as a solution to an agency problem is also 
present in KM and other studies like Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), who integrates collateral constraints on the firm’s side by assuming that labor 
employment must be partially financed through loans. 
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at least, until 𝑡 + 1. The idiosyncratic nature of the entrepreneurs’ bankruptcies holds the authors 
from assuming symmetry within their model, hence studying the partial equilibrium in terms of 
individual agents at arbitrary moments in time, in contrast with what happens in Romer’s 
framework. Given that macro-financial linkages originate at the microeconomic level, one would 
expect for any model with financial frictions to shed light over agent-based phenomena. However, 
given the very nature of the field, we ought to analyze aggregate dynamics and patterns. Therefore, 
under the integration of BGG’s partial equilibrium within a R&D-based endogenous growth 
framework, the agents’ finite horizons may be a concern. 
So far, we’ve identified three incompatibilities between BGG’s partial equilibrium and Romer’s 
model: the latter is fundamentally deterministic, while BGG has a probabilistic setting; in the two 
models, agents present different time horizons; and, while Romer’s framework is derived in 
continuous time, BGG is written in discrete time, as suggested by the above mentioned one-period 
gap between the economic decision and the stochastic net worth’s realization. Our main purpose 
is to expand Romer’s model, so as to encompass BGG’s partial equilibrium. In the following section, 
we propose ways to surpass these incompatibilities, in order to build a complete general 
equilibrium model of endogenous growth with financial frictions. 
 
3.2. The model 
 
Let’s take the partial equilibrium setting of external finance dynamics in BGG, where the authors 
start by stating that 
 
(3.1) 𝐵𝑡+1
𝑗 = 𝑄𝑡𝐾𝑡+1
𝑗 − 𝑁𝑡+1
𝑗
  
 
where 𝐾𝑡+1
𝑗  represents the capital bought at 𝑡  by the 𝑗 -th entrepreneur, 𝑄𝑡𝐾𝑡+1
𝑗  the payoff 
realized at 𝑡 + 1, 𝑁𝑡+1
𝑗  the net worth of the 𝑗-th entrepreneur, realized at 𝑡 + 1, and 𝐵𝑡+1
𝑗  is the 
debt amount needed by the 𝑗-th entrepreneur at 𝑡 + 1, borrowed from a financial intermediary 
(e.g. a bank). This means that, at each period, each entrepreneur acquires physical capital through 
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his personal net worth and loans, which is combined with labor through some production 
technology to generate output in the following period. 
In order for the entrepreneur’s net worth to influence the loan terms, the borrowers need to face 
finite time horizons. The rationale is pretty straight forward: the assumption of a Cost State 
Verification (CSV) problem in BGG gives an endogenously motivated reason for the existence of an 
external finance premium, i.e., an opportunity cost for internal funding, meant to compensate the 
lender for a problem of adverse selection and moral hazard. This premium will depend on the 
borrower’s ability to repay its loan at 𝑡 + 1 – i.e., its net worth –, which will be dependent on a 
default probability. For such a probability to exist, the entrepreneur must be allowed to go bankrupt, 
hence the purpose of the finite horizon, which captures the phenomenon of the continuous “birth” 
and “death” of firms, within a given economy. 
We want the entrepreneurial sector in BGG to be analogous to Romer’s capital sector. There are 
two difficulties that we need to surpass. The first one is the extension of the partial equilibrium to 
a continuous framework, which implies reducing the one-period gap to an arbitrarily small gap 
between the agents’ decisions and the variables’ realization. Second, the entrepreneur’s finite 
horizon is incompatible with Romer’s framework, in which firms don’t go bankrupt. This constitutes 
a problem if we ought to integrate the financial accelerator mechanism. The problem of expanding 
Romer’s model such as to encompass BGG’s partial financial equilibrium is, we believe, intimately 
related with the solution of the two above mentioned incompatibilities13. 
By looking at equation (3.1), one could argue that a continuous approximation would be fairly 
straight forward, given that 𝐵𝑡+1
𝑗  is linear both in 𝑄𝑡𝐾𝑡+1
𝑗  and in 𝑁𝑡+1
𝑗 . However, despite the 
mathematical validity, this approximation by time-differentiation wouldn’t be economically 
reasonable. To understand why, let us rewrite (3.1) 
 
(3.2) 𝐵𝑡+ℎ
𝑗 = 𝑄𝑡𝐾𝑡+ℎ
𝑗 − 𝑁𝑡+ℎ
𝑗
 
 
                                                             
13 The original authors introduced monopolistic competition in the retail sector so as to obtain nominal rigidity, intrinsic to the Dynamic New 
Keynesian approach, suited for their purpose of monetary policy analysis. A monopolistic entrepreneurial sector would imply a non-linear relation 
between the entrepreneur’s net worth and his demand for capital. We believe that, by proxying the capital sector’s net worth by the profit function, 
the problem of a non-linear relation does not arise here. 
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with respect to an arbitrarily small time amount ℎ. When ℎ → 0, (3.2) implies that the borrower 
both receives and repays the external funds almost instantaneously, which not only is unintuitive, 
as it does not represent the reality of credit flows at the firm level. 
We know that the free entry condition in Romer’s capital market implies that the investor needs to 
make an initial investment 𝑃𝐴(𝑡) to participate. If we assume that this initial cost is financed 
through a loan, in a similar fashion of Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) with the labor employment, we 
can introduce a model of debt management to replace the current loan dynamics present in BGG. 
We do this by stating that, in any given period, the firm pays some percentage of the outstanding 
debt, which corresponds to the initial investment cost 𝑃𝐴(𝑡).14 The rationale is that some net losses 
are expected at the beginning of the firm’s creation, which may turn to profits once it becomes fully 
developed. In order to preserve the aggregate capital accumulation, we introduce the following 
transversality condition 
 
(3.3) 
∫ (𝑃𝐴(𝜏)  − 𝛽(𝜏)𝑃𝐴(𝜏))𝑑𝜏
𝑡
0
= 0 
 
 
where 𝛽(𝜏) > 0 represents a variable portion of outstanding debt paid at each moment in time. 
The condition implies the full repayment of outstanding debt, in the long run.  
This is an important step in the model’s architecture. The optimal contract established between 
the lender and the borrower in BGG is characterized by the minimum requirement rule for external 
financing 
 
(3.4) ?̅?𝑗𝛾𝑡+1𝑄𝑡𝐾𝑡+1 = 𝑍𝑡+1
𝑗 𝐵𝑡+1
𝑗
  
 
where 𝑍𝑡+1
𝑗  represents a gross non-default rate, ?̅?𝑗  the limit value of the idiosyncratic shock given 
by the stochastic variable 𝑤𝑗 , which fluctuates in the interval [0,1], such that 𝑤𝑗 ≥ ?̅?𝑗  implies 
that the lender is able to repay the loan at the rate 𝑍𝑡+1
𝑗 , and 𝛾𝑡+1 represents the aggregate risk 
                                                             
14 Further in this study, we show how this introduction of indebtedness comes at the cost of the complementarities between capital goods 
assumption. 
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of the economy. If, on the other hand, 𝑤𝑗 < ?̅?𝑗 , then the firm is unable to repay its loan and goes 
bankrupt. Under the proposed model of continuous debt management, we can adapt (3.4) to our 
capital sector 
 
(3.5) ?̅?𝑗𝛾𝑅𝑗(𝑡)𝑥𝑗(𝑡) = 𝑟𝑥𝑗(𝑡) + 𝑍𝑗(𝑡)𝛽𝑗(𝑡)𝑃𝐴,𝑗(𝑡)  
 
where 𝑅𝑗(𝑡) represents the 𝑗-th firm’s selling price of its capital goods 𝑥𝑗(𝑡), and 𝑟 represents 
the risk-free rate. We omit the expected value operators so as to facilitate the exposition. Equation 
(3.5) implies that the capital firm must guarantee, at each moment, sufficiently large sales so as 
to meet both the required production inputs and debt obligations. This represents the minimum 
requirement to be met by the 𝑗-th capital firm and gives us a reinterpretation of the profit function 
in Evans et al (1998), expanded in order to include a decomposed risk measure. Hence, the profit 
of the 𝑗-th capital firm is given by 
 
(3.6) 𝜋𝑗(𝑡) ≡ 𝑤𝑗𝛾𝑅𝑗(𝑡)𝑥𝑗(𝑡) − 𝑟𝑥𝑗(𝑡) − 𝑍𝑗(𝑡)𝛽𝑗(𝑡)𝑃𝐴,𝑗(𝑡)  
 
where the optimal output level guarantees that 𝜋𝑗(𝑡) > 0. Hence, liquidity and wealth distribution 
begin to matter. Levered capital firms become susceptible to adverse shocks, in the advent of 
which they may see a large fraction of their net worth wiped off which, in turn, may lead to systemic 
persistence and amplification of the financial shocks.  
The households allocate their wealth between the riskless asset at the risk-free rate and loans to 
the capital firms, according to their risk aversion. Omitting the role of a financial intermediary15, the 
households are able to diversify the idiosyncratic risk component through a sufficiently big number 
of granted loans, which implies that their opportunity cost is the riskless rate. Therefore, the 
applicable finance rule is 
 
(3.7) ?̅?𝑗𝛾𝑅𝑗(𝑡)𝑥𝑗(𝑡) = 𝑟𝑥𝑗(𝑡) + 𝑟𝛽𝑗(𝑡)𝑃𝐴,𝑗(𝑡) ?̅?
𝑗𝑅𝑘𝑅𝑗(𝑡)𝑥𝑗(𝑡) = 𝑟𝐷𝑗(𝑡) 
                                                             
15 We make this simplification because, at any given moment, the intermediary’s net worth is set to zero. 
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We still need to find the external finance premium paid by the 𝑗-th capital firm. To do so, we need 
to introduce the monitoring cost ℎ𝑤𝛾(𝑡)𝑅𝑗(𝑡)𝑥𝑗(𝑡), where ℎ ∈ [0,1[, in line with BGG’s CSV 
problem. In order to do so, we need to observe that there are two possible outcomes in any given 
period. If 𝑤𝑗 ≥ ?̅?𝑗 , the lender pays 𝑟𝑥𝑗(𝑡) + 𝑟𝑃𝐴,𝑗(𝑡)  and keeps the difference 
𝑤𝑗𝛾𝑅𝑗(𝑡)𝑥𝑗(𝑡) − 𝑟𝑥𝑗(𝑡) − 𝑟𝑃𝐴,𝑗(𝑡) . If, on the other hand, 𝑤𝑗 < ?̅?𝑗 , the borrower goes 
bankrupt, whilst receiving nothing. The lender pays the monitoring cost ℎ𝑤𝛾𝑅𝑗(𝑡)𝑥𝑗(𝑡) and 
keeps what he finds. Following (3.7), we modify the rule so as to include the default probability 
𝐹(?̅?𝑗) = Pr[𝑤𝑗 < ?̅?𝑗] and, by extension, the external finance premium, such that 
 
(3.8) 
{[1 − 𝐹(?̅?𝑗)]?̅?𝑗 + (1 − ℎ)∫ 𝑤𝑑𝐹(𝑤)
?̅?𝑗
0
} 𝛾𝑅𝑗(𝑡)𝑥𝑗(𝑡)
= 𝑟(𝑥𝑗(𝑡) + 𝛽𝑗(𝑡)𝑃𝐴,𝑗(𝑡)) 
 
Similarly to what happens under the original framework, we maintain the risk neutrality assumption 
in our borrowers. For that reason, they are willing to absorb the monitoring costs faced by the 
lenders, thus facing the external finance premium ℎ ∫ 𝑤𝑑𝐹(𝑤)
?̅?𝑗
0
. 
We are now capable of writing our optimization problem for the 𝑗-th firm. Naturally, the firm will 
ought to maximize its profits, subject to the finance constraint imposed by (3.8). The result is the 
following generalization of Romer’s original optimization problem 
 
(3.9) max
𝑥𝑗(𝑡),?̅?𝑗
(1 − Γ(?̅?𝑗)) 𝑠𝑅𝑗(𝑡)𝑥𝑗(𝑡)   
 
subject to 
 
(3.10) [Γ(?̅?𝑗) − ℎΦ(?̅?𝑗)]𝑠𝑅𝑗(𝑡)𝑥𝑗(𝑡) = 𝑥𝑗(𝑡) + 𝛽𝑗(𝑡)𝑃𝐴,𝑗(𝑡)  
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where Γ(?̅?𝑗) ≡ ∫ 𝑤𝑓(𝑤)𝑑𝑤
?̅?𝑗
0
+ ?̅?𝑗 ∫ 𝑓(𝑤)𝑑𝑤
+∞
?̅?𝑗
 is the expected gross share of profits of the 
lender, ℎΦ(?̅?𝑗) ≡ ℎ ∫ 𝑤𝑓(𝑤)𝑑𝑤
?̅?𝑗
0
 are the expected monitoring costs and 𝑠 =
𝛾
𝑟
. Moreover, 𝑓 
represents a density function, which means 𝑓(𝑤) = 𝐹′(𝑤) . While Γ(?̅?𝑗)  and ℎΦ(?̅?𝑗) 
represent real numbers, 𝑠 remains variable in the steady state. Therefore, in order to obtain a 
balanced growth path solution, we define the following concept: 
Def: we call a steady state solution to the vector 𝑅 ∈ ℝℱ𝑡 that solves the optimization problem 
(3.9) such that 𝐸{𝑠} =
1
𝑟
, where ℱ𝑡represents the cardinality of the set of capital firms in existence 
at each moment 𝑡 in time. 
By defining the steady state solution as we did and using it in order to find a balanced growth rate 
for the economy, we are stating that, in the equilibrium, we would expect for the absence of 
aggregate shocks, for any probability distribution of the variable 𝛾. After defining a new function 
and using Lagrange multipliers, the first order conditions for problem (3.9) are16 
 
(3.11) [1 − Γ(?̅?𝑗) − 𝜆 (Γ(?̅?𝑗) − ℎΦ(?̅?𝑗))] 𝑠𝑅𝑗(𝑡) − 𝜆
= 𝜆𝛼𝛽𝑗(𝑡)
1 − 𝛼
𝛿
𝐿𝑌,𝑗
−𝛼𝑥𝑗
𝛼−1 
 
(3.12) Γ′(?̅?𝑗)𝑠𝑅𝑗(𝑡) = 𝜆 (Γ′(?̅?𝑗) − ℎΦ′(?̅?𝑗)) 𝑠𝑅𝑗(𝑡)  
 
where 𝜆 is the Lagrange multiplier. This is known to be true because the solutions are interior.  
From (3.12), it follows that 
 
(3.13) 
𝜆 =
Γ′(?̅?𝑗)
Γ′(?̅?𝑗) − ℎΦ′(?̅?𝑗)
 
 
 
                                                             
16 The conditions follow from the existence of a perfectly competitive labor market under Romer’s framework, together with  the accumulation of 
intellectual stock ?̇? = 𝛿𝐿𝐴(𝑡)𝐴(𝑡). 
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which is always a positive number. We can see this by assuming, like it was made in BGG, that 
(
?̅?𝑗𝑓(?̅?𝑗)
1−𝐹(?̅?𝑗)
)
′
> 0. When solving (3.13), we get 
𝑓(?̅?𝑗)(1−𝐹(?̅?𝑗)−?̅?𝑗𝑓(?̅?𝑗))
(1−𝐹(?̅?𝑗))
2 > 0, which is the same as 
saying that Γ′(?̅?𝑗) > Φ
′(?̅?𝑗) Now, let 
 
(3.14) 
𝜌(?̅?𝑗) =
𝜆
1 − Γ(?̅?𝑗) − 𝜆 (Γ(?̅?𝑗) − ℎΦ(?̅?𝑗))
 
 
 
then, we find that the optimal rent level of the 𝑗-th capital firm is given by 
 
(3.15) 
𝑅𝑗 =
𝜌(?̅?𝑗)(1 − 𝛼)
𝑠𝛼 [1 − 𝜌(?̅?𝑗) (Γ(?̅?𝑗) − ℎΦ(?̅?𝑗))]
 
 
 
where 𝜌(?̅?𝑗) is a measure of the elasticity between the lender’s expected return and that of the 
borrower, relative to the total contractual expected return.  
Let us denote by 𝑖 the generic element of the set of final goods’ firms in existence at any given 
moment in time. We know from Evans et al (1998) that this sector’s optimization problem yields 
the following conditions: 
 
(3.16.1) 
𝑤𝑌,𝑗(𝑡) = (1 − 𝛼)
𝑌𝑗(𝑡)
𝐿𝑌,𝑗(𝑡)
 
 
 
(3.16.2) 
𝑅(𝑡) = 𝛼 (
𝐿𝑌,𝑗(𝑡)
𝑥𝑗(𝑡)
)
1−𝛼
 
 
 
By intersecting the final goods’ demand with the equilibrium rent, we find that the equilibrium 
capital consumption of a non-symmetric economy with financial frictions is given by 
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(3.17) 
𝑥𝑗(𝑡) = 𝐿𝑌(𝑡) [
𝑠𝛼2 (1 − 𝜌(?̅?𝑗) (Γ(?̅?𝑗) − ℎΦ(?̅?𝑗)))
𝜌(?̅?𝑗)(1 − 𝛼)
]
1
1−𝛼
 
 
 
Our next goal is to integrate the possibility of bankruptcy within our capital sector, such that it is 
possible to evaluate long term dynamics – agents’ optimal choices, balanced growth paths - of a 
given economy, over an infinite horizon. 
Let ℱ𝑡 ⊂ ℕ be the non-empty number of capital firms in existence at any given moment 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇. 
Although individual firms can disappear, by guaranteeing that there will always be at least one firm 
in existence at any given moment, one could study the optimal behavior of those in existence when 
𝑡 → ∞. Hence, in order to study the aggregate dynamics of some economy through the optimal 
behavior of capital firms, we need to guarantee both intra-temporal and intertemporal symmetry, 
i.e., to guarantee the existence of a representative firm at any given moment, whose optimal 
behavior is invariant across time. Following Acemoglu’s theorem of the representative firm (2009, 
pp. 229-231), let 𝑋𝑡 = {∑ 𝑥𝑗𝑗∈ℱ : 𝑥𝑗 ∈ 𝑋𝑗 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ 𝑗 ∈ ℱ𝑡}  be the economy’s set of 
production possibilities and ?̂?(?̂?) ⊂ 𝑋 the set of profit maximizing net supplies. Let ?̂? = ∑ 𝑥?̂?𝑗∈ℱ  
be the optimal production decision of a representative firm, for the optimal capital goods’ price 
vector ?̂? ∈ ℝ𝐹 , which corresponds to (3.15). Let’s assume that ?̂? ∉ ?̂?(?̂?). This implies the 
existence of 𝑥´ such that ?̂?𝑥´ > ?̂??̂?. By definition of 𝑋, there exists {𝑥𝑗}𝑗∈ℱ with 𝑥𝑗 ∈ 𝑋𝑗 such 
that 
 
(3.18) 
?̂? (∑𝑥𝑗
𝑗∈ℱ
) > ?̂? (∑𝑥?̂?
𝑗∈ℱ
) 
 
 
such that there is at least one 𝑗′ ∈ ℱ such that ?̂?𝑥𝑗′ > ?̂??̂?𝑗′, which contradicts the hypothesis 
that ?̂?𝑗 ∈ ?̂?𝑗(?̂?) . Hence, we are in sufficient conditions to guarantee the existence of a 
representative capital firm, for which ?̂? = ∑ 𝑥?̂?𝑗∈ℱ . Maintaining the symmetry Romer et al created 
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on the final goods’ sector, we can deduce symmetry over the individual rents, in order to find the 
following optimal equations for the representative capital firm 
 
(3.19) 
𝑅 =
𝜌(?̅?)(1 − 𝛼)
𝑠𝛼 (1 − 𝜌(?̅?)(Γ(?̅?) − ℎΦ(?̅?)))
 
 
 
(3.20) 
𝑥(𝑡) = 𝐿𝑌(𝑡) [
𝑠𝛼2 (1 − 𝜌(?̅?)(Γ(?̅?) − ℎΦ(?̅?)))
𝜌(?̅?)(1 − 𝛼)
]
1
1−𝛼
 
 
 
that aggregate the dynamics of the individual firms. In appendix A, we prove that equations (3.19) 
and (3.20) are consistent with the accumulation of physical capital within Romer’s framework. 
From Acemoglu’s theorem and proof of consistency, 𝜌(?̅?)  in equations (3.19) and (3.20) 
represents a sum of the individual 𝜌(?̅?𝑗), over the set ℱ𝑡 ⊂ ℕ. Given that ℱ𝑡 is non-empty, while 
individual capital firms can go bankrupt – meaning, in the steady state, 𝜌(?̅?𝑗) = 0  – the 
representative agent has an infinite horizon. We can thus proceed to find the balanced growth path 
of the economy.  
 
3.2.1. Balanced Growth Path Solution 
 
From Romer’s representative household’s optimization problem  
 
(3.21) 
max
𝐶(𝑡)
∫ 𝑒−𝜌𝑡𝑢(𝐶(𝑡))𝑑𝑡
∞
0
 𝑠. 𝑡. 
𝐵(𝑡)̇ = 𝑟𝐵(𝑡) + 𝑟𝛽(𝑡)𝑃𝐴(𝑡)𝐴(𝑡) + 𝑤(𝑡)𝐿(𝑡) − 𝐶(𝑡)
− ∫ (𝑃𝐴(𝜏)  − 𝛽(𝜏)𝑃𝐴(𝜏))𝑑𝜏
𝑡
0
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we get the Euler equality 
 
(3.22) 
𝑔𝑐 =
1
𝜎
(𝑟 − 𝜌) 
 
 
The consumer side of the economy in our model is equivalent to the one in Romer’s model, hence 
the use of (3.22) and the assumption of a constant real interest rate up until now. Taking our 
definition of the steady state solution and applying it in order to calculate the growth rate of the 
economy, we find that the amount of capital goods given by (3.20) is constant. Therefore, the 
patent price 
 
(3.23) 
𝑃𝐴 =
1 − 𝛼
𝛿
𝐿𝑌
−𝛼𝑥𝛼 
 
 
is also constant. This holds true because, by (3.20), the ratio 
𝑥(𝑡)
𝐿𝑌(𝑡)
 is constant. In the appendix A, 
we deduct the Bellman-Hamilton-Jacobi equation for the patent price, in terms of the capital firm’s 
profit. By showing that (3.23) is constant, we find that 
 
(3.24) 
𝑟 =
𝛿𝛼
(1 + 𝛽)(1 − 𝛼)
𝐿𝑌 (1 −
𝛼𝑙(?̅?)
1 − 𝛼
) 
 
 
where  
 
(3.25) 
𝑙(?̅?) ≡
(1 − 𝜌(?̅?)(Γ(?̅?) − ℎΦ(?̅?)))
𝜌(?̅?)
 
 
 
and, because the economy’s production function is Cobb-Douglas, we are able to build the system  
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(3.26) 
{
 
 
 
 
 
 𝑔𝑐 =
1
𝜎
(𝑟 − 𝜌)
𝑔𝑌 = 𝛿?̅? −
𝑟(1 + 𝛽)(1 − 𝛼)
𝛼 (1 −
𝛼𝑙(?̅?)
1 − 𝛼)
𝐾(𝑡)̇ = 𝑌(𝑡) − 𝐶(𝑡) − ∫ (𝑃𝐴(𝜏)  − 𝛽(𝜏)𝑃𝐴(𝜏))𝑑𝜏
𝑡
0
 
 
 
which, because of the transversality condition (3.3), and because the model is to hold over an 
infinite horizon, gives us the balanced growth path solution 
 
(3.27) 
𝑔 =
𝛿?̅?𝛼 (1 −
𝛼𝑙(?̅?)
1 − 𝛼) − 𝜌(1 + 𝛽)(1 − 𝛼)
𝛼 (1 −
𝛼𝑙(?̅?)
1 − 𝛼) + 𝜎(1 + 𝛽)(1 − 𝛼)
 
 
 
which is a generalization of the original framework that encompasses the effects of financial 
frictions in the economy, through 𝑙(?̅?). Further details are available in appendix A. What we’ve 
done to prove equality between the growth rates was to take the limit of 
𝐾(𝑡)̇
𝐾(𝑡)
 when 𝑡 → ∞. 
Because of the transversality condition, the third term disappears, rendering the capital 
accumulation equivalent to that of Romer’s original framework. Figure 1 represents a simulation 
ran for the general equilibrium solution.  
 
Fig. 1: General Equilibrium Solution 
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The plot displayed in figure 2 was obtained with the following parameter values: 
 
 𝜎 = 2;      𝜌 = 0.02;     𝛼 = 0.4  
 ?̅? = 1;      𝛽 = 1;      𝛿 = 0.1  
 
which, in turn, were chosen considering the previous simulation by Thompson (2008). The 
negatively sloped plot represents the consumer’s preferences, while the positively sloped plot 
represents the technology curve. The intersection occurs at the point where the interest rate equals 
0.0931998 and the economy’s growth rate equals 0.0365999. Under the assumption of a normal 
distribution of the contractual risks and, therefore, the existence of well-defined cumulative 
distribution functions, we chose the value −1.0667 for our parameter 𝑙(?̅?). 
Equation (3.27) thus represents the equilibrium long term growth rate of an economy with agent-
based financial frictions and generalizes (2.33). The following subsection explores the properties 
of the equilibrium regarding fluctuations on 𝑙(?̅?). 
 
 
3.3. Interaction between informational asymmetries and economic growth 
 
The function 𝑙 evaluated in ?̅?, formally, represents the following relation between the contractual 
returns 
 
(3.28) 𝑙(?̅?) = −𝜀𝑁𝐿,𝐺𝐵(1 − Γ(?̅?)) − 2(Γ(?̅?)− ℎΦ(?̅?))  
 
where 𝜀𝑁𝐿,𝐺𝐵 represents a ratio of derivatives – sort of an elasticity measure between the lender’s 
net expected returns and the borrower’s gross expected returns. Then, from (3.27) we obtain 
 
(3.29) 
𝑔′(𝑙(?̅?)) = −
𝛼2(1 + 𝛽)(𝛿?̅?𝜎 + 𝜌)
[𝛼 (1 −
𝛼𝑥
1 − 𝛼) + 𝜎
(1 + 𝛽)(1 − 𝛼)]
2 
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and 
 
(3.30) 
𝑔′′(𝑙(?̅?)) = −
2𝛼4(1 + 𝛽)(𝛿?̅?𝜎 + 𝜌)
(1 − 𝛼) [𝛼 (1 −
𝛼𝑥
1 − 𝛼) + 𝜎
(1 + 𝛽)(1 − 𝛼)]
3 
 
 
 
This means that the effects of these asymmetries on economic growth are always negative. Figure 
2 represents a simulation plot of (3.29). The parameters’ values remain the same as the ones 
used in the previous simulation. 
 
 
Fig. 2: Plot of the derivative of g, regarding the financial parameter x 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For the general case, the applicable domain where the solution doesn’t explode is 
{𝑙(?̅?) ∈ [0,1]:  𝑙(?̅?) <
𝜎(1+𝛽)(1−𝛼)2+𝛼(1−𝛼)
𝛼2
} which maps to {𝑦 ∈ ℝ:   𝑦 < 0}. The solution 
explodes when 𝑙(?̅?) tends to 
𝜎(1+𝛽)(1−𝛼)2+𝛼(1−𝛼)
𝛼2
. Here, increases on the elasticity 𝜀𝑁𝐿,𝐺𝐵 
further decrease economic growth at a marginally increasing rate, while increases of the external 
finance premium are beneficial to economic growth. If one were to assume an inverse relation 
between risk aversion and our elasticity measure, this could imply a positive effect of the risk 
aversion coefficient 𝜎 on growth, as suggested by Davidsson (2012). Furthermore, giving that 
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𝑔′ → 0  when 𝑙(?̅?) → 0 , the effects of these informational asymmetries on growth are 
asymptotically null.  
The overall negative effect of the asymmetries on growth is in line with studies such as Fu (1996), 
who argues that asymmetric information affects investment which, in turn, directly affects 
economic growth. The marginal contribution of this study to the large body of literature on 
informational asymmetries, growth and capital accumulation is to shed some light at the channel 
through which such effects may take place. The overall increase on the elasticity measure results 
from a decrease on the economy’s monitoring costs. Assuming that the monitoring costs ℎ are an 
increasing function of the representative firm’s revenue (Jain, 2001), this decrease in ℎ means 
lower revenues and, therefore, lower aggregate growth. In our simulated example, this happens in 
the neighborhood of 
21
2
. If the elasticity drops low enough, its effects on growth tend to zero. 
As it is in the original partial equilibrium framework, the effects of isolated systemic shocks in some 
given period also move across time. To help visualize the accelerator mechanism, let’s take, 
between 𝑡 and 𝑡 + 1, the aggregate shock 𝛾 − ∆, where ∆ > 0 represents any unforeseen effect 
that affects the representative capital firm’s output, relative to the previous period. We approximate 
𝐾(𝑡)̇ ≈ 𝐾(𝑡 + 1) − 𝐾(𝑡), which follows from the households’ intertemporal constraint in (3.21), 
because of the linearity of 𝐾(𝑡)̇  in its terms. We also assume that fluctuations in the capital 
accumulation are very small, which is a plausible assumption, given that the capital’s growth rate 
𝐾(𝑡)̇
𝐾(𝑡)
 is constant. In face with the negative shock, the firm’s profits are given by 
 
(3.31) 
𝜋∆(𝑡) ∶= 𝑤(𝛾 − ∆)
(1 − 𝛼)
𝑠𝛼𝑙(?̅?)
𝑥(𝑡) − 𝑟𝑥(𝑡) − 𝑥𝛽(𝑡)𝑃𝐴(𝑡) 
 
 
which, in order to isolate the quantitative effects of the aggregate shock, can be represented as  
 
(3.32) 
𝜋∆(𝑡) = 𝜋(𝑡) −
∆𝑤(1 − 𝛼)
𝑠𝛼𝑙(?̅?)
𝑥(𝑡) 
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which, given the proposed approximation, when replaced in the households’ intertemporal 
constraint, will decrease the following period’s aggregate capital by 
∆𝑤(1−𝛼)
𝑠𝛼𝑙(?̅?)
𝑥(𝑡). Appendix A 
offers technical details on the relation between aggregate capital accumulation and the capital 
firms’ profits. Without loss of generality, we attach this loss on the representative household’s 
balance sheet to the returns from loans to capital firms. Holding the remaining terms constant, 
this implies a decrease of the number of firms entering the capital market at 𝑡 + 1, given the 
decrease of the external financing needed to meet the capital firms’ free entry condition. Under the 
premise of the representative capital firm, this implies a lower aggregate output on the following 
period, hence perpetuating and amplifying the isolated shock ∆ at moment 𝑡. 
 
3.4. Some final considerations 
 
In its original model, Evans et al went further, by assuming the existence of complementarities 
between capital goods, and obtaining a multiple equilibrium balanced growth path solution. In 
appendix A, we show how the same assumption, under our proposed framework, leads to a 
contradiction, and cannot be made. The introduction of financial frictions therefore sacrifices the 
introduction of imperfect substitutability between capital goods, hence falling short of the original 
model. 
We have created an extension of Romer’s model that encompasses financial frictions, through the 
introduction of uncertainty in the capital sector’s profit function. This created endogenously 
motivated informational asymmetries between lenders and borrowers, which turned out to have an 
impact on the monopolistic capital market and on long-term growth, through a function 𝑙 evaluated 
in ?̅?. We were then able to reach a balanced growth path solution in which the sensitivity of the 
representative parties expected contractual returns to one another negatively influences economic 
growth. While this feature may add complexity to the original framework and potentially make it 
more representative of the economic reality, the introduction of indebtedness appears to unable 
the assumption of complementarities between capital goods, hence falling short of the original 
model. A solution for this incompatibility may be a direction for future research. 
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4. Testing the model: an empirical analysis 
 
This section’s main purpose is to test the empirical validity of our expanded version of Romer’s 
model, through appropriate econometric mechanisms. Section 4.1. briefly discusses the dynamic 
nature of economic growth and presents the data, as well as the econometric model of interest. 
The results are then presented and discussed in Section 4.2., followed by some concluding 
remarks in Section 4.3.  
  
4.1. Data and Econometric Model 
 
There is a large body of empirical research on the determinants of economic growth. Although 
there are many variables that, historically, have contributed to explain growth, the importance of 
initial conditions is well established in the literature, and the need of initial income as a regressor 
in any empirical model is perhaps indisputable. The claim can be supported by countless empirical 
studies – to name a few, take Barro (1991), Mankiw et al (1992), Borensztein et al (1998), Alfaro 
et al (2004) and Moral-Benito (2012). In econometric terms, this idea is materialized through the 
analysis of dynamic panels. 
The use of dynamic panel data models, namely for aggregate growth analysis, is far from new, and 
one of its advantages relative to simpler data structures is that it allows for a better understanding 
of the dynamics of adjustment (see e.g. Islam (1995)). Therefore, the technical challenges that 
arise under this framework are well known. While some of them can be fixed under more 
conventional procedures such as least squares estimation – e.g. fixed effects (FE) and random 
effects (RE) commonly used on static panels – others may require more specialized methods. 
Furthermore, the researcher may find additional challenges in panels with a small number of 
individuals 𝑁 and large time period 𝑇 – typical macro panels. 
Dynamic panel models are characterized by the presence of the lagged dependent variable among 
the regressors, i.e., 
 
(4.1) 𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 , 𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑁; 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇  
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where 𝜌 is a scalar, 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′  is the 1 × 𝐾 matrix of the regressors (excluding, of course, the initial 
income) and 𝛽 is the 𝐾 × 1 matrix of coefficients. The error component 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is assumed to consist 
of a time-invariant individual effect and a white-noise effect, such that 
 
(4.2) 𝑢𝑖𝑡 =  𝜇𝑖 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡  
 
where 𝜇𝑖  ~𝐼𝐼𝐷(0, 𝜎𝜇
2)  and 𝑣𝑖𝑡~𝐼𝐼𝐷(0, 𝜎𝑣
2)  are independent of each other and among 
themselves. This regression has two sources of persistence over time. Autocorrelation, due to the 
presence of the lagged dependent variable, and the unobserved heterogeneity 𝜇𝑖. Throughout this 
chapter we will show that the most appropriate procedure for the model’s estimation is based on 
the work of Blundell and Bond (1998), and it’s known as the difference generalized method of 
moments (GMM) estimator.  
Our panel contains observations for 27 member states of the European Union17 during the period 
2008-2016 (i.e. 𝑁 = 27 and 𝑇 = 9). Although, following Durusu-Ciftci et al (2017), we could’ve 
additionally singled out Finland and the Netherlands from the analysis, we believe that the choice 
would’ve only increased the possibility of finite-sample biases, without a necessarily proportional 
precision increase on the estimation of the effects of our parameter of interest on growth. The 
baseline empirical growth model is the augmented Solow model, which means that the selected 
variables comprise measures of initial income, rates of human and physical capital accumulation 
and population growth. In addition to these variables, we’ve also built a variable that proxies the 
previous chapter model’s key parameter, 𝑙(?̅?), and we’ve included some variables considered by 
Moral-Benito (2012), according to their Bayesian posterior probabilities. Table 1 lists both the 
regressors and the dependent variable.  
The variable 𝑙𝑤𝑖𝑡  was built according to definition (3.28) and can thus be separated in two 
components. First, the elasticity of the lenders’ liquid returns relative to the borrowers’ gross 
returns was approximated by calculating the ratio between the countries’ banks return on assets 
(after tax) and the representative firms’ gross profits, both as percentage variations. The data for 
the banks’ return on assets was obtained through the Global Financial Development digital 
database, from The World Bank. The data for each country’s representative firms’ gross profits 
                                                             
17 Due to data unavailability, Denmark was not included in the analysis. 
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Table 1: Variable Sources and Definitions 
 
Variable 
 
Source 
 
Definition 
Lgdp (Dependent Variable) OECD Logarithm of real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita 
Invshare PWT 6.2 Capital investment as a share of GDP 
Lfp15 WDI Labor force participation rate as a percentage of the population with ages 15+ (national 
estimates) 
Lhsp OECD Logarithm of household spending in millions of USD 
Lp WDI Logarithm of total population 
Lfwe1 WDI Percentage of total labor force with basic education 
Lfwe2 WDI Percentage of total labor force with intermediate education 
Lfwe3 WDI Percentage of total labor force with advanced education 
Lw  Amadeus 
+ GFD 
Financial parameter from the extended version of Romer’s model that proxies the behavior of 
𝑙(?̅?) 
Popg WDI Population growth 
Up WDI Logarithm of the total urban population 
Yp WDI Logarithm of the population below 15 years old 
   
Note: OECD refers to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s digital database; PWT 6.2 refers to Penn World Table 6.2; WDI refers to World Development Indicators from 
The World Bank; GFD refers to Global Financial Development from The World Bank; and Amadeus refers to a European database with information about approximately 21 million firms, including 
financial reports, accounting and administrative data. 
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was obtained through Amadeus: for each country in the panel, we’ve filtered the active firms with 
a maximum current ratio of 1, therefore limiting our analysis to companies with at least as much 
liabilities as assets. From most of the samples of filtered firms meeting these requirements, we’ve 
randomly selected between 10-50% of the lists18. We then used Acemoglu’s theorem to average 
each sample at each period, thus obtaining, for each country, a time-series of the representative 
firms’ gross profits. The second component of (3.28) was obtained in a similar fashion, by 
averaging the firms’ annual operational revenues. The results are displayed on table 2. The 
apparently downward trend in the returns may be related with the global financial crisis of 2008, 
the beginning of our panel period.  
 
Table 2: Representative firms’ annual gross profits 
 
Country 
 
2008 
 
2009 
 
2010 
 
2011 
 
2012 
 
2013 
 
2014 
 
2015 
 
2016 
Austria 15,8934 2,5071 14,0623 9,3237 6,8007 7,1015 5,7311 6,4757 6,9184 
Belgium 2,7613 2,0394 3,0228 2,9467 2,4705 2,3244 3,4579 3,9311 4,1002 
Bulgaria 4,3271 2,2881 2,0247 3,0101 3,5613 2,7851 2,0914 2,6788 2,7381 
Croatia 1,2307 -0,123 -0,9994 -0,344 -0,246 0,0564 0,7377 1,1329 1,5194 
Cyprus 5,8502 1,4311 3,5972 -3,052 -3,520 -2,077 -0,442 -0,669 0,8720 
Czech 
Republic 1,1309 -0,297 0,8941 0,4978 0,5041 0,0012 1,1199 1,5965 1,4637 
Estonia 3,7929 1,5300 5,5690 6,9686 7,1330 7,2877 5,6555 5,3026 4,6495 
Finland 3,3524 2,4016 3,2178 3,0552 2,5296 2,3288 2,0038 2,3627 2,0590 
France 1,8926 1,4124 1,8805 1,4422 0,8615 0,9879 0,7552 0,6996 0,4622 
Germany 2,8411 2,2328 3,4572 3,4317 3,1931 2,5515 2,6906 2,8731 4,1284 
Greece -0,8516 -1,881 -4,5887 -6,736 -8,449 -4,979 -4,242 -5,180 -6,143 
Hungary 1,7682 1,2349 1,1090 1,0661 3,4142 2,0791 2,1567 2,8979 3,0244 
Ireland 1,3444 0,0672 0,6369 1,4918 2,4393 2,6005 2,6125 1,9949 2,7072 
Italy 0,6383 0,0747 1,0393 0,8316 -0,013 0,2429 0,2293 0,4303 0,7848 
Latvia 1,5207 -3,200 0,1259 1,8468 2,7897 2,6281 1,7087 1,7065 -0,131 
Lithuania 0,9303 -2,177 -0,7672 1,3946 0,9462 1,1788 0,6656 -0,144 0,4176 
Luxembourg 0,4900 -1,041 -0,8275 -1,662 -0,131 -1,027 -0,011 0,2255 0,7586 
Malta 4,1240 4,2746 4,9135 5,4723 4,5590 5,4247 6,0420 6,6598 8,8822 
Netherlands 3,6467 4,6337 5,2386 3,5021 2,5986 2,0551 2,6176 2,9039 5,2646 
Poland 2,0617 2,2347 2,3659 1,0499 1,7944 1,4843 1,4454 1,6763 1,3984 
Portugal -0,2714 -0,224 2,3308 0,9804 -0,009 1,2428 2,4577 3,2998 3,8283 
Romania 1,9450 0,6198 1,1797 1,2557 0,5702 1,0806 1,7154 2,8969 3,1705 
Slovakia 2,8477 -0,554 0,9780 0,4840 0,0802 -0,249 0,8414 0,8675 0,9763 
Slovenia 1,5290 -0,440 1,2109 1,2948 1,1682 1,5314 2,1383 2,4330 3,4420 
Spain 1,2979 0,5549 1,1240 0,6810 0,3272 0,6977 1,4277 2,2427 3,0194 
Sweden 4,1088 4,8248 5,6970 5,1429 4,2716 4,4532 5,2556 5,9407 5,6917 
United 
Kingdom 1,7111 -2,591 3,7323 3,4145 3,4083 3,7896 3,3749 2,9919 1,4848 
                                                             
18 For Austria, Cyprus, Greece, Lithuania and Luxembourg, we’ve selected the entirety of the output lists, due to the relative shortage of companies 
meeting the needed requirements. 
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Due to data shortage, we could not evaluate our variables before 2008, in order to compare the 
pre and post crisis GDP’s response to variations in the regressors. Table 3 contains the descriptive 
statistics of our variables. 
The first period of the panel was marked by a low average 𝑙𝑤𝑖𝑡, with high cross sectional variability. 
Given that the variable reflects the symmetric form of (3.28), it can suggest both a low average 
elasticity of the lenders’ returns relative to the borrowers’ returns and/or low representative firms’ 
returns. By the end of the analyzed period, this variable’s coefficient of variation decreased to 
approximately 1/10 of its initial value.  
The population growth decreased between 2008 and 2016, which reflects on only slight variations 
on both the percentages of urban and young populations in these countries. This is not surprising, 
since it reflects a global trend of decreasing birth rates in developed countries (see, e.g., Grant et 
al (2004)). 
The overall trend amongst the different levels of education in each country’s labor force, reflecting 
human capital accumulation, was a substantial decrease between 2008 and 2016. The cross 
sectional average of the labor force engaging in secondary education dropped around 3 percentage 
points, from approximately 32% to 29% of the labor force. The cross sectional (percentage) average 
of the labor force with a college degree registered a slight increase due to the overall drop of the 
cross sectional averages. The main effect was therefore registered at the level of intermediate 
education, Lfwe2. Hence, one would expect this variable to have a more significant impact on 
growth, during this period, than its counterparts. Figure 4 helps us to visualize the variable’s 
evolution. This downward trend may be unsurprising if we consider its possible relation with the 
global phenomenon of slowing innovation and technological diffusion (Andrews, Criscuolo, & Gal, 
2015). This effect, combined with a cross sectional average decrease of approximately 10 
percentage points in capital investment, despite an average increase on household spending, may 
explain the slow aggregate growth registered between 2008 and 2016; this appears to be 
consistent with the findings of a growing body of literature on the great productivity slowdown (see, 
e.g. Duval et al (2017)). 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
               
 N 
 
Mean Standard dev. p25 p50 min max 
VARIABLES 2008 2016 2008 2016 2008 2016 2008 2016 2008 2016 2008 2016 2008 2016 
               
Lgdp  27 27 10.30 10.52 0.389 0.360 9.944 10.22 10.34 10.47 9.553 9.878 11.37 11.56 
Invshare 27 27 0.250 0.146 0.0519 0.0593 0.214 0.0958 0.248 0.131 0.165 0.0711 0.343 0.320 
Lfp15 27 27 57.97 58.35 4.909 4.750 53.81 55.13 59.24 58.61 49.10 49.50 66.55 72.09 
Lhsp 27 27 3,362 4,098 4,805 5,910 429.8 554.4 1,351 1,728 61.44 78.46 16,822 21,105 
Lp 27 27 15.89 15.90 1.448 1.437 14.98 14.87 16.04 16.10 12.92 13.03 18.22 18.23 
Lfwe1 27 27 36.66 33.99 11.56 10.87 28.34 26.05 36.72 33.86 14.92 15.30 63.58 58.56 
Lfwe2 27 27 68.07 65.31 5.135 5.126 63.88 60.95 66.89 64.21 60.32 58.33 79.37 76.38 
Lfwe3 27 27 80.03 78.62 3.608 3.946 76.44 74.80 80.31 78.82 73.41 71.52 85.86 84.25 
Lw  27 27 29.14 146.4 348.0 174.4 14.90 26.09 88.43 142.8 -1,017 -345.4 684.7 521.4 
Popg 27 27 0.328 0.261 0.869 0.851 -0.175 -0.315 0.313 0.129 -1.666 -1.271 2.039 2.289 
Up 27 27 0.714 0.728 0.125 0.129 0.611 0.627 0.684 0.708 0.522 0.538 0.976 0.979 
Yp 27 27 0.159 0.156 0.0174 0.0180 0.145 0.144 0.155 0.152 0.133 0.131 0.204 0.217 
               
Note: elaborated by the author, with Stata 14 software. The displayed data refers both to the first and last observed years of the panel.
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Fig. 4: Evolution of the percentage of labor force with an intermediate level of 
education 
 
 
 
The following section will be devoted to the estimation of model (4.1) through several methods, 
from which the most efficient one will be singled out. There will be a discussion and explanation of 
the efficiency and drawbacks present at each estimation procedure. Two main goals can be 
identified. First, we want to assess the overall significance of 𝑙𝑤𝑖𝑡, which may validate our proposal 
for the extension of Romer’s model to incorporate informational asymmetries. However, due to 
data unavailability, we will certainly have to consider the differences between the asymptotic 
properties of the estimators and their finite sample behaviors. Although some small sample 
corrections may be applied in some cases, the results should definitely be retested in future 
research. Second, assuming the statistical significance of 𝑙𝑤𝑖𝑡 in explaining aggregate growth, we 
want to assess its signal. As predicted, the effect of 𝑙𝑤𝑖𝑡 on growth should be negative. A proximity 
to zero should indicate either a very high or low elasticity. 
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4.2. Interpretation and Discussion 
 
Table 4 displays the estimation results of model (4.1), through ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed 
effects (FE) and random effects (RE) estimation procedures. All estimates are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and random patterns of autocorrelation among countries. Furthermore, those 
estimates were calculated with year dummy variables, to make the assumption of no correlation 
across individuals in the idiosyncratic disturbances made by the robust estimates of the coefficient 
standard errors more likely to hold. The choices made regarding the explanatory variables were 
influenced by the descriptive statistics - the major effect, regarding human capital accumulation, 
appears to lie with the intermediate level of education, which is supported by the literature (Moral-
Benito, 2012) – and by issues of collinearity arising due to the percentage of young population and 
the logarithm of household spending. Furthermore, we’ve identified an adjustment process in the 
capital investment share of GDP, hence the use of its first lag. 
The OLS estimation of model (4.1) presents highly statistically significant estimates, including for 
the variable 𝑙𝑤𝑖𝑡 . However, it faces one major problem, given that, by construction, 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 is 
endogenous to the error term 𝑢𝑖𝑡: because 𝑦𝑖,𝑡 is a function of the unobserved heterogeneity 𝜇𝑖, 
it follows that 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 is also a function of 𝜇𝑖. This is called “dynamic panel bias”. The existing 
positive correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the error term makes the OLS 
estimator upward biased and inconsistent. The RE GLS estimation is also biased, given that the 
demeaned transform renders the new lagged variable endogenous to the error term. 
The FE estimation, despite eliminating 𝜇𝑖, does not eliminate dynamic panel bias19. Under the 
Within Groups transformation, 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 becomes 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1
∗ = 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 − ∑ 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1/(𝑇 − 1)
𝑇
𝑡=2  and the 
error becomes 𝑢𝑖,𝑡−1
∗ = 𝑢𝑖,𝑡−1 − ∑ 𝑢𝑖,𝑡−1/(𝑇 − 1)
𝑇
𝑡=2 , which correlates negatively with 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1, 
by construction. This, therefore, renders the Within estimator of 𝜌  downward biased and 
inconsistent. However, the estimator will be consistent when 𝑇 → ∞. For this reason, some 
authors argue that, when analyzing macro panels, which typically cover a small number of 
countries 𝑁 over a large period 𝑇, the bias of the Within estimator will not be that large for 
moderate 𝑇 (Baltagi, 2005, pp. 135-136). However, that is not the case here. Furthermore, given 
                                                             
19 An Hausman test on the RE and FE estimates indicated that the cross-sectional differences are systematic, hence justifying the need to worry 
about dynamic panel bias and eliminating the fixed effect. 
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Table 4: Estimation Results of the Least Squares Methods 
 OLS  Random Effects   Fixed Effects 
Log. GDPpc(t-1) 1.0106*** 0.9995*** 0.6704*** 
 (0.0118) (0.0155) (0.0532) 
Investment share(t-1) -0.3223*** -0.3301*** -0.0424 
 (0.0753) (0.1087) (0.3212) 
Lw -0.0000** -0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Labor Education 2 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0016 
 (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0019) 
Population Growth -0.0070   
 (0.0052)   
Urban Population  -0.0048 -0.5038 
  (0.0555) (0.3233) 
    
R2 0.99 . 0.93 
RMSE 0.03 0.03 0.03 
N         148               148              148   
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
 
that the OLS estimates are upward biased and the FE estimates are downward biased, it follows 
that the “true” value of the parameter 𝜌 must belong to the interval ]0.6704, 1.0106[.  This gives 
us a useful check on the results from the other estimators. 
While the dynamic panel bias problem could, in principle, be solved by instrumental variables 
estimation (2SLS), the estimators would be biased if we faced ourselves with weak instruments. 
Furthermore, following Baum et al (2003), we’ve performed a White test in order to exclude 
homoskedasticity, rendering the GMM-based methods preferable to IV, ceteris paribus. The 
difference GMM (dGMM) estimator introduces lagged levels of the endogenous variables, rendering 
them predetermined instead. The optimal estimators are obtained by solving a minimization 
problem in a system of moment conditions, where too many instruments can lead to 
overidentification of the system, with too many algebraic solutions and, ultimately, inefficient 
estimates. It then uses the first-differences transform to purge the fixed effects. Table 5 displays 
 
outubro 2019 
the GMM’s estimation results. The results suggest high statistical significance, in particular, for the 
capital investment share from the previous period, which presents a negative relation with current 
period’s logarithm of real GDP per capita. We’ve predicted the residuals of the first stage regression 
of the capital investment share on its first lag and used them on the full OLS equation. A t-test on 
the coefficient of the residuals resulted in a rejection of the null hypothesis, thereby rendering the 
investment share endogenous, along with the lagged dependent variable. The sign of the lagged 
investment share stays unchanged across the estimations. Assuming that the aggregate capital 
investment is financed by credit growth in the economy – a necessary assumption for the validity 
of our proposed extension of Romer’s model –, the negative sign of the estimate may be understood 
in light of Leitão (2012), whose results suggest that credit growth weakens the banking system, 
hence weakening the overall economy. The benefits of intermediate education of the labor force 
on economic growth might then be conditioned by the amount of credit in the banking system. 
Relating with our proposed growth theory, this could yield some useful information on the nature 
of the different marginal relations between asymmetries and growth discussed in section 3.3. 
Nonetheless, the coefficient of the labor force with an intermediate level of education holds no 
statistical significance across the different estimations. However, given the underlying panel’s 
dimension and Moral-Benito’s (2012) rule of thumb for inference validity, one should, at the very 
least, be skeptic about generalizing these relations to periods other than those following some great 
financial distress. Furthermore, both the results for population growth and the initial income appear 
to be consistent, in direction, with other results such as the FE LSDV model for the unrestricted 
model of Islam (1995). 
The efficiency of the difference GMM estimator increases with 𝑇. However, it has been shown to 
perform poorly on persistent series with small 𝑇 (Baltagi, 2005, pp. 147-148). The system GMM 
(sGMM) estimator, on the other hand, has high efficiency gains relative to dGMM, as 𝜌 → 1. 
However, the estimate obtained for 𝜌 does not lie within the credible range – values above 1 
suggest an unstable dynamic, with accelerating divergence away from equilibrium values. The 
dGMM estimate, however, not only lies within the credible range, but is actually in pair with the 
estimates of Islam (1995) for the OECD sample. Both estimates were subject to a small -sample 
correction to the covariance matrix estimate, resulting in 𝑡  instead of 𝑧  test statistics for the 
coefficients and an 𝐹 instead of Wald 𝜒2 test for overall fit, which tends to over-reject the null as 
a result of small sample sizes (Roodman, 2009). We’ve instrumented 
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Table 5: Estimation Results of the Generalized Method of Moments’ Methods 
 sGMM  dGMM 
Log. GDPpc(t-1) 1.0737*** 0.9553*** 
 (0.0207) (0.0775) 
Investment share(t-1) -0.6098*** -0.8980*** 
 (0.0800) (0.1412) 
Lw -0.0001*** -0.0001*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Urban Population 0.0763** -0.8255 
 (0.0352) (0.5218) 
Labor Education 2 0.0013** 0.0025 
 (0.0006) (0.0029) 
Population Growth -0.0372*** -0.0251 
 (0.0118) (0.0287) 
   
Sargan test 0.00 0.41 
   
N         148               129   
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01 
 
both 𝑙𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑖𝑡  and the first lag of 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 with second order levels, which are exogenous by 
construction. This means that Stata created 7 instruments for 𝑙𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑖𝑡  and 6 instruments for 
𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡. The remaining regressors were considered exogenous, along with 7 time dummies 
– the first two rows of each country are eliminated in the equation in levels – making a total of 23 
instruments in the dGMM estimation. Here, the Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions did not 
reject the null hypothesis, with 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 > 𝐶ℎ𝑖2 = 0.155, which attests for the validity of these 
instruments. We’ve rejected the null hypothesis in the sGMM estimates, hence rendering the 
instruments invalid. Furthermore, the Arellano-Bond test for second-order autocorrelation – which 
is the one of interest, given the levels used as instruments for the endogenous regressors – did not 
reject the null hypothesis of inexistence of autocorrelation, with 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 > 𝑧 = 0.990. As expected, 
in both models we’ve rejected the null of first order autocorrelation, which is built in the model by 
default. Finally, we’ve applied the forward orthogonal deviations transform instead of first 
differencing to eliminate the country-specific effect, following the work of Hayakawa (2009) 
Theoretically, we believe that the results render the estimates obtained through dGMM technically 
superior. As expected, ?̂? ∈ ]0.6704, 1.0106[. 
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The estimate for the coefficient of 𝑙𝑤𝑖𝑡 renders the informational asymmetries between lenders 
and borrowers irrelevant – i.e., close to null - for aggregate growth, with a high degree of statistical 
significance, during the analyzed period. In light of our proposal for the expansion of Romer’s model, 
we would then expect the sign of the coefficient to be negative. The results from table 5 suggest a 
high statistically significance for 𝑙𝑤𝑖𝑡 and, as expected, a negative effect, which may suggest the 
empirical validity of the proposed financial parameter in explaining economic growth.  
We’ve started the analysis by identifying the two main goals. First, we wanted to assess the overall 
significance of 𝑙𝑤𝑖𝑡 , in order to validate our proposal for the extension of Romer’s model to 
incorporate information asymmetries. Second, we wanted to assess the direction of the effect of 
these financial asymmetries on growth. The results were, in part, conclusive. 
The estimates present somewhat unanimous results regarding the impact of 𝑙𝑤𝑖𝑡 on growth. Our 
theoretically superior estimator dGMM finds high statistical significance for 𝑙𝑤𝑖𝑡. The impact of 
𝑙𝑤𝑖𝑡 on economic growth is negative, albeit close to null. The results hence indicate that, not only 
is the financial parameter statistically significant, as it also has the predicted sign. This suggests 
that the theoretical framework may, at least, be close to the truth. 
These results should not, however, stand without scrutiny. Data limitations forced the analysis to 
be limited to the post-crisis period, with a limited panel dimension. The asymptotic properties of 
the GMM estimators have been shown to suffer from finite-sample biases. Despite the careful 
choice of the appropriate estimation methods and the small-sample correction to the covariance 
matrix estimate, there may be efficiency gains in expanding the analysis in order to cover a greater 
number of countries over a greater period of time.  Ideally, future data sets will be large enough to 
analyze pre and post crises relations between informational asymmetries and aggregate growth. 
Furthermore, the employment of Bayesian analysis – and, quite specifically, Bayesian Model 
Averaging (BMA) – could potentially enrich the obtained results. Looking at Moral-Benito (2012), 
one could apply the BACE-SDM approach to the dynamic panel in order to obtain the parameters’ 
posterior probabilities, after obtaining the models’ posterior probabilities through Markov Chain 
Monte Carlo simulations. However, this approach must necessarily be based on least squares 
estimation of the dynamic panel data model (3.29) – for efficiency purposes, through the FE model 
– in order to obtain a value for each model’s sum of squared errors. As we stand, the analysis 
would be inefficient, given the small 𝑇 defining our panel and, very possibly, the lack of studies to 
base our  𝑙(?̅?)’s prior assumption on. We address this thought to future research. 
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5. Final Remarks 
 
The main purpose of this research was to contribute to a growing body of literature on the effects 
of financial frictions on the real economy. Having built a theoretical model, we then wanted to test 
it empirically, ideally giving it validity. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first one 
expanding Romer’s model such as to include financial imperfections, and the first one presenting 
an equilibrium long term growth rate as a function of such imperfections. 
To address the matter of building a theoretical model, we’ve analyzed several research studies 
from several authors. Romer’s model is widely viewed as the state of art of R&D-based endogenous 
growth models. Although there are some DSGE and business cycle models in the literature that 
might have had some potential to address this particular study, we felt, from the analysis of studies 
such as Morales (2003), that the outline of Romer’s model would be more appropriate and easy 
to work with. Through a process of analyzing various models with financial markets and studying 
their differences and similarities with our baseline growth model, BGG’s study became our choice 
for the proposed expansion, due to the its importance in the literature and to the overall perceived 
feasibility. 
The full expanded model sheds some light over the interaction between agent-based frictions and 
aggregate economic growth and shows how the marginal relation changes with fluctuations on the 
periodical payments of outstanding debt, aggregate capital amount and/or the discount rate of the 
economy. To the best of our knowledge, the main contribute of this study is to shed some light on 
the channels through which these particular financial frictions influence economic growth. 
Notwithstanding, the financial idiosyncratic shocks remain exogenous to the model which is, in this 
author’s opinion, a downside of the proposed expansion. Further research should address the 
challenge of endogenizing these financial shocks. Studies such as that of Gerke et al (2013) may 
suggest some potential in the introduction of monetary policy to address this gap, as well as to 
enable the debate on policy implications, in the context of our expanded version of Romer’s model. 
From the econometric analysis, we were able to prove the statistical significance of the financial 
parameter in the BGP growth solution. The regression results were similar to the simulation results, 
i.e., to what one would expect under the assumption of a normal distribution of the contractual 
risks. The sign of the coefficient’s estimate was in line with the predictions made in subsection 3.3. 
The estimations were optimized through GMM methodology, which are sensitive to small sample 
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biases. Future empirical research should be made with a wider data set, in order to strengthen the 
results’ robustness. The analysis of pre and post financial crisis data should yield some important 
information on the mechanics of the proposed inflection point, and on possibly hidden effects that 
may help endogenizing financial shocks, in future theoretical models. 
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Appendix A 
 
In order to solve system (3.26) with the accumulation of capital over an infinite horizon, we need 
to study the wealth allocations within the economy. Let’s start by analyzing the following equation 
 
(A.1) 𝐵(𝑡) = 𝐾(𝑡) + 𝑃𝐴(𝑡)𝐴(𝑡)  
 
where 𝐵(𝑡) represents the assets from the representative consumer (lender), 𝐾(𝑡) the stock of 
physical capital and 𝑃𝐴(𝑡)𝐴(𝑡) the holding of shares on capital goods. The corresponding law of 
motion of the consumer’s assets is given by 
 
(A.2) 𝐵(𝑡)̇ = 𝑟𝐵(𝑡) + 𝑟𝛽(𝑡)𝑃𝐴(𝑡)𝐴(𝑡) + 𝑤(𝑡)𝐿(𝑡) − 𝐶(𝑡)
− ∫ (𝑃𝐴(𝜏)  − 𝛽(𝜏)𝑃𝐴(𝜏))𝑑𝜏
𝑡
0
 
 
 
where 𝑤(𝑡) represents the consumer’s wage, 𝐿(𝑡) the working time and 𝐶(𝑡) the consumption. 
In each moment in time, consumers build a well-diversified portfolio with firm loans, which is why 
their opportunity cost is the risk-free rate. The functional form is in line with Durusu-Ciftci et al 
(2017), given the separation of the households’ funds in two kinds of investment. Because of the 
finance rule built in the borrower’s optimization problem, equation (A.2) is consistent with firms’ 
behavior. 
Substituting (A.1) in (A.2) and solving for the evolution of the stock of physical capital, we get 
 
(A.3) 𝐾(𝑡)̇ = 𝑟𝐾(𝑡) + (𝑟𝑃𝐴(𝑡) − 𝑃𝐴(𝑡)̇ )𝐴(𝑡) + 𝑟𝛽(𝑡)𝑃𝐴(𝑡)𝐴(𝑡)
− 𝑃𝐴(𝑡)𝐴(𝑡)̇ + 𝑤(𝑡)𝐿(𝑡) − 𝐶(𝑡)
− ∫ (𝑃𝐴(𝜏)  − 𝛽(𝜏)𝑃𝐴(𝜏))𝑑𝜏
𝑡
0
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If we take equation (3.16.2), replace 𝑠 =
𝑅𝑘
𝑟
 and solve it for 𝑟, we get the following 
 
(A.4) 
𝑟(𝑡) =
𝛾𝛼2𝑙(?̅?)
(1 − 𝛼)
𝑌(𝑡)
𝐾(𝑡)
 
 
 
In equilibrium, final goods producers have zero profits, unlike the capital goods 
producers. In order to participate in the capital goods’ market, one has to 
acquire a patent for the value of 𝑃𝐴(𝑡). After this initial investment, the producer has property 
rights over its time horizon. Notwithstanding, our representative producer in existence at each 
moment in time will enjoy property rights over an infinite horizon. The patent price is given by 
 
(A.5) 
𝑃𝐴(𝑡) = ∫ 𝜋𝑢𝑒
−∫ 𝑟𝑣𝑑𝑣
𝑢
𝑡 𝑑𝑢
∞
𝑡
 
 
 
because future cash flows are discounted at a rate that matches the cost of obtaining the necessary 
funds to finance those cash flows. Therefore, 
 
(A.6) 
𝑃𝐴(𝑡)̇ = − [𝜋𝑢𝑒
−∫ 𝑟𝑣𝑑𝑣
𝑢
𝑡 ]
𝑡
∞
+∫ 𝜋𝑢 [𝑟(𝑡) (𝑒
−∫ 𝑟𝑣𝑑𝑣
𝑢
𝑡 )] 𝑑𝑢
∞
𝑡
 
 
 
which is equivalent to the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman 
 
(A.7) 𝜋(𝑡) = 𝑟(𝑡)𝑃𝐴(𝑡) − 𝑃𝐴(𝑡)̇   
 
Taking (A.4) and the fact that 𝐾(𝑡) = 𝐴(𝑡)𝑥(𝑡), by solving for the amount of capital goods we 
get  
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(A.8) 
𝑥(𝑡) =
𝛾𝛼2𝑙(?̅?)
𝑟(𝑡)(1 − 𝛼)
𝑌(𝑡)
𝐴(𝑡)
 
 
 
which we can now use in the capital firms’ expanded profit function under optimal behavior, yielding 
 
(A.9) 
𝜋(𝑡) = 𝛼
𝑌(𝑡)
𝐴(𝑡)
−
𝛾𝛼2𝑙(?̅?)
(1 − 𝛼)
𝑌(𝑡)
𝐴(𝑡)
− 𝑟(𝑡)𝛽(𝑡)𝑃𝐴(𝑡) 
 
 
implying that 
 
(A.10) 𝐾(𝑡)̇ = 𝑟𝐾(𝑡) + 𝜋(𝑡)𝐴(𝑡) + 𝑟𝛽(𝑡)𝑃𝐴(𝑡)𝐴(𝑡) − 𝑃𝐴(𝑡)𝐴(𝑡)̇
+ 𝑤(𝑡)𝐿(𝑡) − 𝐶(𝑡) − ∫ (𝑃𝐴(𝜏)  − 𝛽(𝜏)𝑃𝐴(𝜏))𝑑𝜏
𝑡
0
 
 
 
Recalling (3.16.1), that the assumption of a competitive labor market implies 𝑤𝑌(𝑡) = 𝑤(𝑡) =
𝑤𝐴(𝑡) and that the free entry condition in the capital goods market is equivalent to 𝑃𝐴(𝑡)𝐴(𝑡)̇ =
𝑤𝐴(𝑡)𝐿𝐴(𝑡) and, therefore, 𝑃𝐴(𝑡)𝐴(𝑡)̇ = (1 − 𝛼)𝑌(𝑡)
𝐿𝐴(𝑡)
𝐿𝑌(𝑡)
, we have that 
 
(A.11) 
𝐾(𝑡)̇ = 𝑟𝐾(𝑡) + 𝛼𝑌(𝑡) −
𝛾𝛼2𝑙(?̅?)
(1 − 𝛼)
𝑌(𝑡) − 𝑃𝐴(𝑡)𝐴(𝑡)̇ + 𝑤(𝑡)𝐿(𝑡)
− 𝐶(𝑡) − ∫ (𝑃𝐴(𝜏)  − 𝛽(𝜏)𝑃𝐴(𝜏))𝑑𝜏
𝑡
0
 
 
 
which is equivalent to 
 
  
65 
 
(A.12) 
𝐾(𝑡)̇ = 𝑌(𝑡) − 𝐶(𝑡) − ∫ (𝑃𝐴(𝜏)  − 𝛽(𝜏)𝑃𝐴(𝜏))𝑑𝜏
𝑡
0
 
 
 
which allows us to relate the BGP growth rates in (3.36). 
  
  
66 
 
Appendix B 
 
Building upon Evans et al (1998), we would introduce complementarities between capital goods 
by defining the following production function 
 
(B.1) 
𝑌(𝑡) = (∫ 𝑥𝑗
𝜑𝑑𝑗
𝐴
0
)
𝜃
, 𝜃 > 1, 𝜃𝜑 = 𝛼 
 
 
where the assumption 𝜃 > 1 is made so that an increase in the quantity of one good increases 
the marginal productivity of the other good (Thompson M. , 2008). Furthermore, in order to solve 
the model for a constant growth rate, we impose the following: 
 
(B.2) 
𝜀 =
𝜃 − 1
1 − 𝛼
 
 
 
From the assumption of a perfectly competitive labor market we can verify that (1.26) continues 
to hold within this framework. However, because of the new functional form (B.1) for the production 
function, the rental price for the capital goods is now given by 
 
(B.3) 
𝑅𝑗(𝑡) =
𝜕𝑌
𝜕𝑥𝑗
= 𝛼𝐿𝑌
1−𝛼𝐴𝑗
𝜃−1𝑥𝑗
𝛼−1 
 
 
which, rearranged and with symmetry, is equivalent to  
 
(B.4) 
𝑥(𝑡) = 𝐿𝑌(𝑡)𝐴
𝜀(𝑡) [
𝛼
𝑅(𝑡)
]
1
1−𝛼
 
 
 
However, considering equations (1.22) and (1.23), we have that 
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(B.5) 
𝑥(𝑡) = 𝐿𝑌(𝑡) [
𝛼
𝑅(𝑡)
]
1
1−𝛼
 
 
 
which implies that 𝐴𝜀(𝑡) = 1 and, therefore20, that 𝜃 = 1. This contradicts the initial assumption 
that 𝜃 > 1, invalidating the assumption of complementarities between capital goods. 
                                                             
20 We’re excluding the trivial case where 𝐴(𝑡) = 1. 
